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Risky IP
Andres Sawicki*
This Article challenges a standard proposition in intellectual property
theory: creators are risk averse and, by extension, IP risk is undesirable.
The interdisciplinary field of creativity research suggests that this
proposition is wrong. A willingness to take risks appears to be an
essential part of the creative personality, and creative individuals may
even prefer risk to certainty. Creativity research also indicates that risk
might be an environmental factor facilitating creativity, whether or not
creators themselves prefer it. As a result, IP scholars should not
generally assume that creators are risk averse; instead, the most
plausible starting point is that creators are risk seeking, at least
compared to the general population and perhaps even in absolute terms.
More generally, IP scholars must take a more nuanced approach to the
impact of IP risk than the simplified risk-preference approach they have
pursued thus far.
The analysis here has significant implications for many persistent
questions in IP law and policy. Uncertain doctrines, like the fair use
defense in copyright law, might not be as problematic as ordinarily
assumed. And efforts to make IP more predictable, like the Supreme
Court’s recent opinion in Nautilus v. Biosig, may have hidden costs.
Most fundamentally, the analysis suggests that patents and copyrights—
rewards of uncertain value—are better able to stimulate creativity than
more predictable mechanisms like grants or salaries.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is supposed to provide incentives to artists and
inventors.1 This is ultimately an empirical claim about the effects of IP
law. Intellectual property scholars accordingly spend a significant
amount of time trying to assess whether IP actually encourages creators
to produce and disclose inventions, or to fix expressive works in tangible
media of expression.2 And because IP is not the only way to support
these activities—salaries, grants, and prizes might be used instead of or
in addition to IP—these assessments are relative.3
Despite increased attention to these issues, we do not yet have a
complete answer regarding which mechanism is best; or, perhaps more
precisely, under what circumstances one mechanism is better than any
other. Still, we can make progress by focusing on particular dimensions
along which to compare IP and its alternatives.4 In this Article, I focus
on two dimensions in particular: risk and creativity.
First, I focus on the risk associated with the IP system.5 The premise
of IP is that creators will decide to create at least in part because doing so
will entitle them to the risky rewards associated with IP rights. But other
incentive mechanisms like salaries or grants might present less risk than
1. At least, that is the standard view. See infra text accompanying notes 26–30 (describing
incentive thesis and alternatives). I use “IP” and “intellectual property” interchangeably as the
prose demands. Also, I use these terms to refer to the areas of law that are primarily concerned
with promoting creativity—patent and copyright law—even though trademark law can fall under
the heading of IP too, and creativity likely plays some role matter in that body of law as well. See
generally Laura A. Heymann, A Name I Call Myself: Creativity and Naming, 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 585 (2012) (exploring the intersection of creativity, copyright law, and trademark law in
naming practices).
2. I will refer to artists and inventors collectively as “creators.”
3. For a sampling of a large literature, see generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of
Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970
(2012); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 999 (2014).
4. See, e.g., Michael Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1373–79 (2009)
(noting a tradeoff between IP’s ability to rely on private information about the value of potential
works against its distributionally undesirable channeling of resources to the creation of goods
demanded by those with greater ability, rather than willingness, to pay).
5. I use risk as an umbrella term to refer to any situation in which more than one outcome is
possible, and we cannot know for sure which outcome will occur. I do not follow a common,
though not universal, tendency to reserve the term risk for scenarios in which the probabilities can
be quantified. See infra Part I.B (developing a terminology designed to facilitate interdisciplinary
research on risk). For now, note only that (1) I attach a more capacious meaning to the term risk
than is common in the law and economics literature; and (2) my usage of the term risk is consistent
with much of the IP literature regarding risk aversion. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 890–91 (2007) (describing as
risk the indeterminacy associated with copyright law’s fair use doctrine).
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do IP rights; at a minimum, the value of a salary or a grant is ordinarily
known in advance. So it is important to know whether IP’s risky
character matters.
Second, I focus on the effect that IP has on creativity. I adopt here the
definition of creativity most commonly applied by sociologists and
psychologists that study the phenomenon: creativity is the creation of
things that are both novel and appropriate.6 IP’s constitutionally
mandated purpose—“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”—is not coextensive with promoting creativity.7 But creativity is
nonetheless an essential ingredient in the work that inventors and artists
do.8 We therefore need to understand how the IP system affects creativity
in order to assess how well IP is furthering its constitutional purpose.
My focus on creativity and risk raises the question at the heart of this
Article: How does IP risk affect creativity? Although the importance of
risk has not escaped the attention of IP scholars, existing treatments are
insufficient. The most common approach—usually drawing on economic
research regarding how the general population responds to risk—is to
treat creators as risk averse in most relevant scenarios.9 This approach
fails to consider the possibility that creators may behave differently from
the general population when faced with risk.
IP scholars have also at times distinguished creators from
intermediaries—the employers, financiers, producers, and distributors
that, in the current system, typically own IP rights. The underlying
premise is that what ultimately matters is the decision making and risk
behavior of intermediaries, not creators. While such an approach is
valuable given the important role that intermediaries play in the
production and distribution of IP, it is at best incomplete. And it is
importantly incomplete to the extent that we wish to understand how
creators might operate in an ecosystem in which intermediaries play less
significant roles than they do today.
In short, IP theory needs a better understanding of how creators
6. See Part II.A, for a fuller elaboration of this definition.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151,
1151 (2007) (“Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright law should seek to
promote . . . .”); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law
and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 1999 (2011) (“Because
innovation usually requires some form of creativity as an antecedent, intellectual property law
generally should also promote, and certainly should not impede, creativity.”); see also Jeanne C.
Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1457–59 (2010)
(explaining the relevance of creativity research for IP law and theory).
9. See infra Part I.C (noting the literature’s treatment of risk preferences).
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specifically respond to risk. To develop that understanding, I turn to the
interdisciplinary study of creativity.10 This field offers important insights
into the psychological and social determinants of creative behavior,
providing a basis for generating accurate predictions about how IP law
will affect the creators it (ostensibly) seeks to influence.
Contrary to the standard approach in the IP literature, the creativity
literature does not support the view that creators are risk averse.11
Instead, theoretical analyses of creativity commonly suggest that creators
are risk seeking.12 Creators produce novel products without knowing in
advance what the outcome of such work will be. As a result, creativity
researchers theorize that creators must be comfortable with, and perhaps
even enjoy, risk. Though the empirical evidence to date is less uniform
than the theoretical literature, it indicates that creators are more likely to
prefer risk than to avoid it.13
To see how this might inform the analysis of IP risk, consider rapper
Big Sean’s track “Control (HOF).”14 That song contained several
samples and a verse from Kendrick Lamar. The label, however, could
not obtain copyright clearance for the samples used.15 Releasing the song
would therefore expose the label, Big Sean, and Lamar to the risk of
liability for copyright infringement. And that risk might affect the odds
that the song would be released.
Assume that the label, Big Sean, and Lamar predict that if the song
were released, (1) there would be a small chance it would be a hit,
resulting in an extremely large gain enabled by the copyrights in the song;
and (2) there would also be a modest chance that the holders of the
samples’ copyrights would sue for infringement, resulting in a modest
10. In doing so, I join a growing number of IP scholars. See Fromer, supra note 8, at 1457–59
(explaining the relevance of creativity research for IP law and theory). For some examples of this
rapidly expanding literature, see generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS,
INNOVATORS AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015); Christopher Buccafusco &
Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011); Cohen, supra note
8, at 1151; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 590 (1987); Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1333 (2015); Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355 (2016);
Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of Creativity in
Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009).
11. Infra Part II.
12. Infra Part III.B.
13. Infra Part III.B.
14. At least, that is the label’s position. The Blast Radius of Kendrick Lamar’s Control Verse,
NPR (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2013/08/21/214145432/theblast-radius-of-kendrick-lamars-control-verse.
15. Id.
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loss. According to the standard IP position, this should be the end of the
story: because these risk-averse creators worry too much about possible
copyright liability, they would not release “Control (HOF).” The creators
would underweight the small chance of an extremely large gain, such that
the expected utility of releasing the song could be negative, even if its
expected value were positive. And even if Big Sean and Lamar wanted
to release the song, the intermediary—that is, the label—would be the
real decision maker, and its risk aversion would stop “Control (HOF)”
from seeing the light of day. Indeed, as it turns out, the label refused to
release the song.
But Big Sean and Lamar were not so easily deterred. Big Sean handed
the song to Funkmaster Flex on New York’s Hot 97, and “Control
(HOF)” subsequently rocketed Lamar to the top of the rap hierarchy,
where he has since remained.16
There are multiple plausible explanations for why the prediction
generated by standard IP theory would have been wrong here.17 At least
one, and one that the conventional wisdom overlooks, is that Big Sean
and Lamar simply have greater tolerance for risk than others do, and their
responses to risk matter too.
Note that this anecdotal insensitivity to risks is not limited to artists—
scientists and engineers also appear to ignore risks that might deter others.
Albert Einstein famously loved sailing, and was rumored to especially
enjoy sailing in dangerous weather. The twist: he could not swim.18
16. See
The
50
Best
Songs
of
2013,
COMPLEX
(Dec.
2,
2013),
http://www.complex.com/music/2013/12/best-songs-of-2013/big-sean-kendrick-lamar-control
(“No matter which verse you prefer it’s hard to deny that ‘Control’ will go down in history as a
milestone in hip-hop, and easily ranks as one of 2013’s most important records.”). Apologies to
Kanye, Drake, Future, and others. Compare KENDRICK LAMAR, TO PIMP A BUTTERFLY
(Interscope 2015), with KANYE WEST, THE LIFE OF PABLO (G.O.O.D. Music 2016); DRAKE, IF
YOU’RE READING THIS IT’S TOO LATE (Cash Money Records 2015); FUTURE, DS2 (Epic Records
2015). Nearly every major music publication deemed Lamar’s most recent album, To Pimp a
Butterfly, the best album of the year.
See To Pimp a Butterfly,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_Pimp_a_Butterfly (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). Then again,
Beyoncé dropped Formation as I was getting this Article ready for submission, so, see Beyoncé,
Formation (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.beyonce.com/formation-dirty/.
17. This example, which highlights the underlying intuitions without a numerical illustration,
naturally obscures some alternate explanations. Maybe the payoff structure I articulated at the
outset was wrong—maybe the expected utility of releasing the song was simply positive, so all
parties wanted to release it, and the label just pretended to refuse so that it could limit its own
liability in the event of a lawsuit. Or maybe the payoffs to the label were different than the ones to
the artists—maybe Big Sean and Lamar’s downside risk was limited by their (relatively) shallow
pockets, and the label placed a low value on the reputational benefits that would accrue largely to
Lamar. For the moment, I set aside these and other complications to simply illustrate the intuitions.
I account for factors that complicate these scenarios in Part IV.
18. Steven Kotler, Einstein at the Beach, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 17, 2012),
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Creators not only seem to seek risks in general, but they also appear
insensitive to legal risks in particular. Consider Steve Jobs and Steve
Wozniak—among their first projects was the design and construction of
“blue boxes,” illegal devices used to make free phone calls worldwide.19
And with respect to filmmakers, musicians, or novelists running legal
risks, well, there are books that tell those stories better than I ever could.20
While these anecdotes cast doubt on the standard IP assumption that
creators are risk averse, there are nonetheless many unanswered questions
regarding the relationship between risk and creativity. Most prominently,
it is unclear whether creators are risk seeking in an absolute sense (i.e.,
they prefer risky prospects to certain ones) or only in a comparative sense
(i.e., they tolerate riskier propositions than does a baseline population).
Creativity researchers have also increasingly turned their focus from
individual personality differences to the environmental conditions that
affect creative performance. And it is an unresolved theoretical and
empirical question how risk as an environmental variable influences
creative performance. Until these questions are resolved, IP scholars
cannot reach firm conclusions about how creators will respond to IP risk.
Furthermore, several factors will complicate generalizations about the
real-world impact of IP risk on creativity. There might be systematic
differences in how various subsets of the creative population respond to
risk: artists might differ from engineers, filmmakers might differ from
novelists, and David Foster Wallace might differ from Tom Clancy.21
Creators might respond uniformly to risks in different domains, or they
might have domain-specific risk behaviors.22 Intermediaries might shield
creators from risk.23 And there is a range of general decision-making
phenomena that might apply, including optimism bias, affective inputs to
risky decisions, and a preference for skill-based uncertainty over luckbased uncertainty.24 All of these factors constitute fruitful areas for
further research into the impact of IP risk on creativity.
Still, we already know enough to discard the conventional assumption
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-playing-field/201210/einstein-the-beach.
19. Seth Fiegerman, Bad Apples: Steve Jobs and the Woz Started Out by Making Illegal Phones,
OPENING LINES (Sept. 14, 2010), http://openinglines.org/2010/09/14/bad-apples-steve-jobs-andthe-woz-started-out-by-making-illegal-phones/.
20. See generally PETER BISKIND, EASY RIDERS, RAGING BULLS: HOW THE SEX, DRUGS, AND
ROCK ‘N’ ROLL GENERATION SAVED HOLLYWOOD (1998) (describing the illicit activities of
Hollywood filmmakers and actors); KEITH RICHARDS, LIFE (2010) (describing the illicit activities
of the Rolling Stones); JACK KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD (1957) (obviously).
21. Infra Part IV.A.1.
22. Infra Part IV.A.2.
23. Infra Part IV.A.3.
24. Infra Part IV.A.5.
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that creators are risk averse, and to begin exploring what the answers to
persistent IP questions would look like in a world with risk-seeking
creators.
Perhaps most fundamentally, this analysis reveals an
underappreciated virtue of IP rights over more predictable mechanisms
for stimulating creativity, like salaries and grants. While the value of a
salary is known in advance, the value of a patent or copyright is risky—
it depends on the outcome of the creative work that results in an invention
or expressive work, and therefore cannot be known at the moment an
individual decides to engage in creative activity. If risk attracts creators,
an IP right would accordingly result in more creativity than a salary of
equivalent expected value, precisely because the IP right is risky and the
salary is not. In weighing IP against proposed alternatives, then, the risky
character of IP would count as a mark in its favor.
There are also potential, though less straightforward, implications for
the finer details of the IP system. Many areas of IP are criticized for their
unpredictability: patent law’s claim construction process and its written
description requirement, for example, or copyright law’s fair use and
substantial similarity rules, for a couple more.25 While these critiques
often rely on the supposed risk aversion of the relevant actors to gain
traction, the analysis in this Article suggests that the evaluation of these
doctrines will depend on a complicated range of factors.
Thus, for example, the uncertainty associated with claim construction
might dissuade some inventors. But that uncertainty might also alter the
mix of inventors who participate in any given technological field. And
that mix may, in turn, influence the creativity of that field’s output as a
whole. Or consider that some uncertainty in IP law occurs where the
normative goals are contested in ways that might render IP’s effects on
creativity less important than other effects. So even if a risky fair use
doctrine has a positive effect on creativity because of the manner in which
more creative individuals respond to that risk, it may still have a negative
effect on less creative uses of copyrighted materials that society wants to
encourage, like political expression or critical commentary. While we
25. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 82–84 (2008) (describing the uncertain
boundaries of patents); Gibson, supra note 5, at 887–91 (illustrating the indeterminacy associated
with the fair use defense and other copyright doctrines); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard,
Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents,
93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1953–54 (2005) (arguing that patent law’s inherent uncertainty undermines its
notice function and promotes “opportunistic and anticompetitive patent lawsuits”); Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2005)
(discussing the uncertainty that pervades patent law); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1818–19 (2007)
(recognizing concerns about inadvertent infringement of patents that occurs because “the edges of
a claim are not always well defined ex ante”).
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should not too quickly conclude that IP risk is harmful, the upshot is that
we should be careful not to rush to the conclusion that it is helpful either.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that risk is central to intellectual
property law and theory, and reviews the existing treatment of risk in IP
scholarship. Part II explains how leading creativity theories treat risk.
Building on those theories, Part III articulates three core hypotheses
regarding the influence of IP risk on creativity, and explains the
implications of those hypotheses for the big question in IP: Under what
conditions are IP rights better than alternative mechanisms for
stimulating work in technology and the arts? Part IV then extends the
analysis to other IP questions and accounts for some simplifying
assumptions made in Part III.
I. RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Part I first shows that risk occupies a central role in intellectual
property law. This Part then develops a terminology that bridges
conversations about risk in the legal, economic, and psychological
literatures. Finally, this Part surveys the current treatment of risk by IP
scholars.
A. The (Un?)bearable Riskiness of IP
The leading justification for IP in the United States is the incentive
thesis.26 According to the incentive thesis, creators need rewards in order
26. This thesis can be found pretty much anywhere you care to look in the American IP world.
For a sampling of the extensive literature, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and
Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577–81 (2009) (citing sources); Jeanne C. Fromer,
Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–52 (2012) (same); Mark
A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129,
129–30 (2004). The incentive thesis is not without its critics. See generally Eric E. Johnson,
Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623 (2012) (arguing that
the incentive theory is mistaken and that technology and the arts will flourish without external
rewards); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 321–22 (2010) (arguing that the
“intellectual-property-as-incentives approach fails to account for the wide range of values at stake
in global intellectual production today”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives:
Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011) (arguing that the incentive
thesis fails to account for the fact that creators value intrinsic factors more than extrinsic factors
such as monetary rewards). There are also alternatives, including the view that IP is best justified
as a kind of moral right of creators. See, e.g., Fromer, supra, at 1771–81 (describing personhood
and labor interests of inventors); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992–95 (2006)
(describing the landscape of moral rights); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators:
Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 499 (2008) (suggesting that the rise of
user innovators might increase the salience of moral rights in patent law). For a recent exploration
of the normative foundations of intellectual property, see generally ROBERT P. MERGES,
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
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to engage in creative activity.27 These rewards are required because
creative activity is costly to the creator and—in the absence of
government intervention—the outputs of creative activity are easily
appropriated by free riders.28 In short, the result of creative work is a
public good, and private actors underinvest in the production of public
goods.
The Constitution contemplates one particular solution to this
underinvestment problem: the granting of an “exclusive Right” to the
product of the creator’s effort—a copyright for an expressive work, a
patent for an invention.29 The constitutional premise is that these
exclusive rights will function as rewards that induce creators to pursue
creative work.30 The IP system that has been built in accordance with
this premise has two primary sources of risk; one arising from the nature
of the rights awarded to creators under it, and the arising from the
particular doctrinal implementations of the system.
The first source of IP risk results from the fact that the value of a
copyright or patent cannot be determined until after the expressive work
or invention is created.31 If demand for the creative good turns out to be
high, then the reward will be valuable; if demand turns out to be low or
nonexistent, the reward will be worthless.32 Indeed, most copyrights and
patents turn out to be worthless, while only a small number prove to be
27. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37–41, 294–97 (2003).
28. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 628–34 (describing the logic of the incentive theory and its
purpose to limit the ability of people to “take a free ride on the labor of persons who create public
goods”).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
30. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors.”).
31. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616
(Richard Nelson ed., 1962) (describing uncertainty regarding the value of inventions); see also
Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1701 (2013)
(describing uncertainty regarding the value of expressive works); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 (2005) (describing uncertainty regarding the value
of patents).
32. There are a number of complications to this simple story. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698 (explaining how anticommons can enable patentees to extract value
even where the demand for the individual invention is low or nonexistent). But the simple story
works for present purposes.
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highly valuable.33 While creators can generate predictions about possible
demand, there is no way to know for sure what it will be ex ante. The IP
system established by the Constitution is therefore necessarily risky
because it uses rewards of unknown value to entice creators to pursue
creative work.
The risky nature of IP rewards means that creators’ responses to risk
will influence the efficacy of the IP system. All else equal, if creators
respond positively to risk, then the fact that the IP system relies on risky
rewards to elicit creative work is an advantage. If, however, creators
respond negatively, then it is a disadvantage.
As an example, suppose Claire is a mid-level associate at a law firm.
She wants to record an album. To do so, she will have to quit her job at
the firm. Claire must therefore choose between: (1) a certain option (stay
at the firm and earn a known salary); and (2) a risky one (record the album
and earn an amount Claire cannot know ex ante).
To see why Claire’s taste for risk matters, imagine that her salary at
the firm is $200,000. The salary is contingent on her performing
acceptable work, but she can pretty much control whether she performs
acceptably, and the amount of the salary is fixed. Claire also predicts
that, if she records her album, she will obtain a copyright that has a 50
percent chance of being worth $400,000, and a 50 percent chance of being
worth $0.34 In an expected value framework, where the value of a risky
option is defined as the probability-weighted sum of the value of each
possible outcome, these options are equivalent—Claire should treat each
option as if it were worth $200,000.
But Claire might not make her decision as the expected value model
predicts.35 Instead, she will take account of many factors, including the
degree of risk associated with each option. Rather than model Claire’s
decision using an expected value analysis (in which she compares the
monetary amounts she anticipates receiving from each option), we should

33. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 7–9 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (presenting data
regarding patent and copyright distributions of value, including that approximately 10 percent of a
sample of renewed German patents accounted for 88 percent of the sample’s total value and that
the seventy best-selling music albums of 1997 accounted for 21 percent of total album sales).
34. Claire would most likely not directly own the copyright, which she would likely transfer to
a record label that produces and distributes the album. For analytical clarity and ease of exposition,
I assume here that Claire is interacting directly with the IP system, rather than through an
intermediary. I relax that assumption in Part IV.A.4.
35. For a helpful explanation of the differences between expected value and expected utility
models, see Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 249–57
(2013).
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therefore model her decision using an expected utility analysis (in which
she compares the utility or satisfaction she anticipates receiving from
each option).36 If she likes risk—because, say, she is excited about the
possibility of massive success—then she would prefer to record the
album, even though in expected-value terms this option is worth no more
than staying at the firm. On the other hand, if she dislikes risk—because,
say, she is anxious about the possibility of utter failure—Claire would
prefer to stay at the firm, even though in expected-value terms this option
is worth no more than recording the album. Claire’s response to the IP
reward thus turns in part on her response to risk.
While the first source of IP risk results from the basic nature of the IP
system, the second flows from the particular implementations of that
system.37 Consider a documentary filmmaker who is editing a scene in
which “a homeless former factory worker spontaneously sings a lyric
from a Bruce Springsteen song.”38 If the documentarian keeps the scene
in her film, she runs the risk of a copyright infringement lawsuit.39 She
might then turn to the fair use doctrine, which excuses from liability
otherwise infringing acts when they pass a multi-factor balancing test.40
This doctrine is, however, famous for its ambiguity.41 It would be
36. Expected utility is the standard economic way to model decision making under risk. See
Mark J. Machina, Expected Utility Hypothesis, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
130, 130–37 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008). The utility function is typically
taken to be a monotonic concave downward function. See Jan Werner, Risk Aversion, in NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 197, 197. Income then has declining marginal
utility—each extra dollar of income produces less additional utility than did the one before it—
producing choices consistent with what we would observe if actors were risk averse. Although
declining marginal utility can therefore form an independent basis for observed risk aversion, the
implied degree of risk aversion has been critiqued as implausibly large. Matthew Rabin & Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Risk Aversion, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 219, 220–22 (2001).
37. Although the above example relates to copyright law, similar points can be made about the
implementation of patent law’s tradeoffs between upstream and downstream contributors to a
creative good. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property & Intellectual Property: An
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects & Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327
(2006); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
38. This example is drawn from Gibson, supra note 5, at 887–88.
39. Id. It is possible that these incidental uses of prior works do not infringe. Id. The key point
is that the filmmaker cannot be sure whether her work infringes.
40. The test considers (1) “the purpose and character of the use”; (2) “the nature of the
copyrighted work”; (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole”; and (4) “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014).
41. Gibson, supra note 5, at 888–90; Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair
Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 99–101 (2010); but see generally Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012) (presenting quantitative data undermining the conventional view that
fair use is unpredictable).
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difficult, if not impossible, to say with certainty whether the
documentarian’s conduct satisfies any of the fair use factors in isolation,
or the test as a whole.42
As a result, the documentarian must make a decision whether to pursue
a riskier option—that is, include the scene, wait to see whether any of the
copyright holders pursue an infringement action against her, and then
hope that the fair use doctrine will excuse her from liability—or a less
risky option—that is, simply omit the scene entirely (or find the copyright
holders and pay them for a license). Even if the riskier option has a larger
expected value because the scene makes the movie that much better and
the odds of a lawsuit are low, she might prefer the less risky alternative
of omitting the scene or paying for a license. We cannot evaluate the
actual effect of the fair use doctrine without an accurate understanding of
the documentarian’s response to risk.
In sum, risk is inevitably part of the IP system writ large. And risk
pervades many features of IP system design. Accordingly, IP scholars
must attend to the impact of risk on creativity if we are to understand how
well IP achieves its core goal of stimulating work in technology and the
arts.
B. Notes on Terminology
One of the many challenges in writing about risk, especially from an
interdisciplinary perspective, is terminological inconsistency: the same
words mean different things in different disciplines. For purposes of this
Article, I develop a terminology that maximizes consistency with the
disciplines that form the primary basis for the analysis: law, economics,
and psychology. Still, because those disciplines do not entirely coincide
in their terminologies, I will necessarily depart from usages common to
one or another.
I use the term risk to refer to any situation in which more than one
outcome is possible, and we cannot know for sure which outcome will
occur. As an example, consider a scenario in which a pharmaceutical
company is trying to decide which of two projects to fund. The first
project will evaluate a substance that might be useful in treating
Alzheimer’s disease; the second will evaluate a different substance that
might be useful in preventing post-surgical infections. The firm cannot
assign quantitative probabilities of success to each project because the
investigations are still in their very early stages. Nor does the firm know
how much it would earn from each drug if it were successfully developed,
42. Gibson, supra note 5, at 888–90.
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although it does have some estimates of the potential market size. This
situation poses risk as I will use the term.43
Economists often limit the term risk to scenarios in which probabilities
are “exogenously specified or scientifically calculable.”44 To capture this
meaning, I use the term quantitative risk. Thus, a bet on a fair coin flip
offering a $10 payoff if it lands heads, and $0 if it lands tails, poses
quantitative risk because each of the possible outcomes—heads or tails—
has an objective probability. There is a 50 percent chance the coin lands
heads and the bet pays $10, and a 50 percent chance the coin lands tails
and the bet pays $0. When it is important to specify that the probabilities
associated with each outcome can be quantified, I will use the term
quantitative risk.
Economists distinguish the quantitative risk posed by the coin flip
from the uncertainty that exists in scenarios in which the probabilities
associated with particular outcomes cannot be quantified.45 As an
example, suppose a person must draw a ball from an urn, which contains
one hundred balls, some red and others white. A person in this scenario
confronts uncertainty because there are two outcomes—red ball or white
ball—but she cannot know the probability that either outcome will
occur.46 I will use uncertainty whenever it is important to note that the
43. I do not follow Frank Knight’s usage reserving risk only for situations where the outcomes
are associated with known probabilities, and uncertainty for situations where the outcomes are
associated with unknown probabilities; that usage is common, though not universal. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 903 (2011) (citing FRANK KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921)) (distinguishing “what the economist Frank Knight classified
as ‘uncertainty’ (where the likelihood of the peril is non-quantifiable) as opposed to ‘risk’ (where
the likelihood is quantifiable)”). My usage is broader than the economic usage of the term, which
is limited to scenarios in which we know (or at least can, in principle, know) the probabilities
associated with all possible outcomes. See Mark J. Machina & Michael Rothschild, Risk, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 36, at 190, 190 (discussing the economic
usage of risk). For an example of the economic usage, consider a bet that pays out $10 if a fair coin
lands on heads and nothing if it lands on tails. Two outcomes are possible, each occurring with a
50 percent possibility. This scenario poses what an economist would call “risk.” The scenario
described in the preceding paragraph—in which a pharmaceutical company must choose which of
two projects to fund without being able to quantify the odds of success for each project, or the
amount it stands to gain—poses what an economist would call uncertainty.
44. Machina & Rothschild, supra note 43, at 190.
45. See Peter P. Wakker, Uncertainty, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS,
supra note 36, at 428 (noting that only some risks can be quantified).
46. Id. Economists sometimes also use the term “ambiguity” to refer to this scenario. See
generally Ken Binmore et al., How Much Ambiguity Aversion?, 45 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 215
(2012). I will avoid that usage because it conflicts with the psychological construct “tolerance of
ambiguity,” which describes how “an individual (or group) perceives and processes information
about ambiguous situations or stimuli when confronted by an array of unfamiliar, complex, or
incongruent clues.” Adrian Furnham & Tracy Ribchester, Tolerance of Ambiguity: A Review of
the Concept, its Measurement and Applications, 14 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 179, 179 (1995).
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probabilities cannot be quantified.
Like my usage (and unlike that of economists), psychologists do not
restrict the term risk to scenarios in which the values and probabilities are
known.47 My usage does, however, depart from a common psychological
usage that limits the term risk to scenarios presenting the possibility of a
negative outcome (e.g., the possibility of being injured in a car
accident).48 I am using risk here as an umbrella term for all scenarios in
which it cannot be determined in advance which outcome will occur,
whether or not probabilities or values can be quantified, and whether or
not the outcomes are positive or negative.
The growing field of behavioral economics, sitting at the intersection
of psychology and economics, has drawn attention to the fact that
responses to risk are context dependent. Particularly prominent in this
literature is Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s work on prospect
theory. Kahneman and Tversky proposed that individuals behave
differently in the face of potential gains than in the face of potential
losses; in their framework, then, risk may influence behavior differently
when the potential outcomes are positive than when the potential
outcomes are negative.49 Where relevant to the analysis, I will use the
modifier upside for scenarios presenting potential gains or positive
outcomes, and the modifier downside for scenarios presenting potential
losses or negative outcomes.
To summarize this Article’s terminology by illustration, an individual
faces downside uncertainty if there is a possibility that she will be
involved in a car accident, and the likelihood of the accident cannot be
quantified. An individual faces upside quantitative risk when she holds
a lottery ticket with a 1 in 1000 chance of winning $1,000,000. And both
scenarios present risk, which, again, I use as an umbrella term to cover
all situations in which more than one outcome is possible.
Although a scenario presenting outcomes with unknown probabilities may be ambiguous in the
sense of this construct because it includes unfamiliar or complex clues, there may be uncertain
scenarios that are accompanied by familiar and simple clues and therefore do not meaningfully
implicate the tolerance of ambiguity construct. For example, it may be uncertain whether a traffic
light we cannot see is red, but we might take the familiar and simple clues of cars slowing down to
tell us something about whether the traffic light is red.
47. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 274
(describing as “risky options” the alternatives to either stay in a cab after discovering that the driver
is drunk or getting out and walking).
48. See, e.g., Ellen M. Peters, An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception and Stigma
Susceptibility, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1349, 1350 (2004) (distinguishing between risks—potential
negative consequences—and benefits—potential positive consequences).
49. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
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C. IP Literature’s Treatment of Risk Preferences
The conventional wisdom in the IP literature is that the relevant actors
behave in a risk-averse manner.50 As an example, consider Thomas
Cotter’s analysis of patent law’s inequitable conduct doctrine.51 That
doctrine bars enforcement of issued patents when it is later discovered
that the patentee breached a duty of candor during the patent application
process.52 Cotter first develops a formal model evaluating how the
doctrine influences a risk-neutral applicant’s incentives to disclose
information.53 He then adjusts the model to account for the “more
realistic assumption . . . that the [patent] applicant (or her agent) is to
some degree risk-averse.”54 This analysis illustrates two tendencies
common in the IP literature: it applies to creators the general
microeconomic finding that people typically make risk-averse decisions,
and it treats creators as indistinguishable from intermediaries.55
There are, however, some exceptions to these tendencies.56 First, IP
50. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 25, at 25.
51. Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Defense, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 757 (2011).
52. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
53. Cotter, supra note 51, at 757–62.
54. Id. at 774 n.126 (citing WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC
PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 538 (9th ed. 2004); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 158 (5th ed. 2001)).
55. For a sampling of the large literature following these tendencies, see PAUL KRUGMAN &
ROBIN WELLS, ECONOMICS 545–49 (2009)) (evaluating the effects of copyright’s termination right
on risk-averse authors and noting that “[i]n general, individuals are assumed to be risk averse”);
Kate Darling, Occupy Copyright: A Law & Economic Analysis of U.S. Author Termination Rights,
63 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 178–81 (2015) (referencing Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279–80 (1948)); Kurt Glitzenstein, A
Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
281, 327–28, 330–31 (1994) (analyzing the effects of patent law’s doctrine of equivalents on riskaverse inventors in light of the general tendency toward risk aversion); see also Clark Asay,
Copyright’s Technological Interdependencies, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 189, 234 (2015); Karen L.
Boyd, Nonobviousness and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic
Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 339 (1997); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent
Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 546 (2010); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of
Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747,
761–67 (2002); Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV.
J.L. TECH. 401, 429 (2010); Kristelia Garcia, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1131 (2014); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law
and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 62–63 (2003); Brian J.
Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–13 (201213); J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach to a Technological Age,
43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 947 (1991).
56. There are also instances where the relevant actors are taken to be risk neutral, with an
acknowledgement that the analysis would have to be modified if the actors were risk averse. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
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scholars have identified industry-specific contexts in which the risk
behavior of intermediaries differs from that of creators themselves. Such
analyses still typically conclude that the relevant actors are risk averse.
James Gibson, for example, argues that the people who actually make
decisions about copyright issues are risk averse, and their decisions
expand the substantive scope of copyright protection through doctrinal
feedback mechanisms that incorporate industry practices.57 One kind of
risk-averse decision maker is the artist who creates the work.58 But
according to Gibson, even if the artist is not risk averse, one of the
“downstream players”—publishers, distributors, record labels, movie
studies, or investors—will be.59
Similarly, in an evaluation of economic research on responses to risk
by innovative firms, Robert Merges posits that the decision makers at
these firms are risk averse.60 As a result, the patent system ought to
“create some extra incentive to offset the inventor’s lower perceived
utility.”61 Merges recognizes the possibility that “inventors are not risk
averse” and are instead “risk-takers,” but does not fully explore the
implications of this possibility for IP more generally because his analysis
focuses on large research and development firms, where risk-averse
managers ordinarily decide whether to pursue a project.62
Behavioral economics has made its way into this literature too. Here,
as in the standard IP literature approach, but unlike the industry-specific
approach of Gibson and Merges, creators are treated as if they are no
different from the general population.
But because behavioral
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV.
985, 1013 n.68 (1998) (adding the possibility that a patentee could be risk averse to the list of
caveats to the main argument in favor of uncertainty in the patent system); Katherine J. Strandburg,
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 109
n.115 (noting that the expectations of inventors “should be discounted to deal with risk aversion
and averaged over all possible outcomes”).
57. Gibson, supra note 5, at 891. For another example of an industry-specific analysis that
concludes that both creators and intermediaries are risk averse, but to varying degrees, see Derek
E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345,
390 (2008) (suggesting that “creators . . . are likely more risk averse than large corporations”).
58. Gibson, supra note 5, at 887–91.
59. Id. at 893.
60. Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 47
(1992).
61. The “extra incentive” in Merges’ proposal is to use the cost of a research project as a plus
factor favoring a finding of nonobviousness. Id. at 43–50.
62. Id. at 50–55; see also Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed ReDefinition of “First-to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 808 (1998) (noting in passing that inventors
are “likely among the least risk-averse people on the planet,” but nonetheless argues that “the
greater [patent-related] uncertainty becomes, the less likely people are to try to create”).
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economists have shown that people sometimes act as if they are risk
seeking, IP scholars applying these insights have similarly argued that
creators might sometimes be risk seeking too.
Thus, for example, Steven Horowitz begins with the behavioral
economic finding of prospect theory: “People tend to be risk seeking for
potential losses and risk averse for potential gains, except when the stakes
are low.”63 Horowitz then argues that creators view copyright law from
two perspectives or frames: (1) as “copyright holders” when they are
motivated to create by the prospect of gains flowing from copyright’s
exclusive reproduction right; and (2) as “potential users” when they face
potential losses due to infringement liability arising from their “use[s of]
preexisting works to create novel expression.”64 Horowitz concludes that
because copyright holders face potential gains, they will be risk averse;
because copyright users (including downstream creators) face potential
losses, they will be risk seeking.65
Similarly, Dennis Crouch begins with the behavioral economics
finding that people overweight long odds.66 Crouch reasons that the
overweighting of long odds suggests that potential innovators, especially
individual inventors, will participate in innovative activity offering a very
low chance of a large reward.67 Patent policy will therefore be more
effective when it modifies the size of the potential reward, rather than its
probability.68
In other instances, IP scholars consider the combined impact of risk
aversion and other decision-making phenomena. For example, in their
analysis of alternative mechanisms for stimulating innovation, Daniel
Hemel and Lisa Ouellette rely on the general economic finding that
“individual decision makers tend to be risk averse.”69
They
63. Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 360,
nn.139–40 (2012); see also Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and
Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 349 (2005) (doubting that competition for IP prospects
will dissipate rents “if some of the participants are risk averse, as behavioral economics would
predict at least when individuals are racing to capture a gain rather than avoid a loss”).
64. Horowitz, supra note 63, at 337–55.
65. Id. at 355–72.
66. See Dennis Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common
Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 144 n.15 (2008) (citing literature exploring why people appear
to treat outcomes that have very small probabilities of occurring as being more likely to occur than
they actually are). This sort of misperception of probabilities is distinct from risk preferences. See
infra text accompanying notes 258–259 (describing how mistaken evaluation of risk may drive
behavior).
67. Crouch, supra note 66, at 161.
68. Id. at 162–65.
69. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 340–42, 340 n.172.
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acknowledge, however, that creators might also be subject to optimism
bias.70 Still, Hemel and Ouellette conclude that risk aversion will be the
dominant influence on creators’ behavior, with the net effect being that
“potential innovators will be more responsive to ex ante mechanisms that
provide an immediate, certain transfer than to ex post mechanisms that
provide a speculative payout in the future.”71
In sum, the existing IP literature suffers from three shortcomings.
First, notwithstanding the exceptions described above, the standard
approach is to simply assert that creators are risk averse, relying on
microeconomic results regarding the general population and eliding any
differences between creators and intermediaries. Second, scholars who
have applied results from behavioral economics continue to treat creators
as though they follow the general population’s tendencies with respect to
risk. And third, when differences between creators and intermediaries
are noted, the analyses emphasize the risk preferences of the
intermediaries, rather than the creators.
IP scholars have not yet considered psychological and sociological
research regarding the impact of risk on creativity.72 Because of this
neglect, the IP literature too readily predicts that IP risk hinders, rather
70. Id. at 340.
71. Id. at 340–42.
72. This is not to say that IP scholars have entirely overlooked the sociological and
psychological research on creativity; to the contrary, a growing literature has drawn from that
research to provide novel and important insights into IP. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 8, at 1483.
But this literature has not seriously considered what creativity research has to say about IP risk.
See id. at 1460 n.117 (noting in passing that “[p]ersonality studies demonstrate that certain
characteristics are common to the creative person,” including “risk taking,” but not evaluating what
that possibility might mean for IP). Joseph Fishman, for example, relies on creativity research to
argue that constraints, including those imposed by law, can stimulate creativity by foreclosing
familiar paths and forcing creators to pursue novel approaches instead. Fishman, supra note 10, at
1339. Although he recognizes that some creators might prefer risk, Fishman treats them as a
deviation from the majority of creators who would prefer the “familiar solutions [that] tend to be
safer.” Id. at 1374–76 (reasoning that “the problem of managing risk” will lead to reliance on
familiar and less creative work like “sequels, film adaptations, and spinoffs”). He therefore
concludes that uncertainty arising from unclear legal doctrines will stifle creativity. Id. at 1385–
88. Similarly, Christopher Buccafusco, Christopher Sprigman, and various colleagues have
embarked on an intriguing series of experiments aimed at exploring the impact of IP law on
creativity. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 31 (identifying a “creativity effect”
whereby creators systematically value their creations more than do owners or buyers of those
creations); see also Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of IP Laws’ Creativity
Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1923 (2014) (showing that higher thresholds for IP protection
may stimulate creativity). But even when their subjects engage in behavior that could plausibly be
explained by a preference for risk, they have too readily dismissed the possibility. Buccafusco &
Sprigman, supra note 10, at 42 n.43 (noting that their subjects’ behavior “could also be
characterized as a propensity to seek risk” but stating that their questions “did not focus on
attraction to risk unlinked to anticipated regret following potential loss”).
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than promotes, “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”73 As explained
below, the creativity literature raises precisely the opposite possibility.
II. THE VIEW FROM THE CREATIVITY LITERATURE
This Part begins by explaining why creativity research matters to
intellectual property law. It then describes what leading theories of
creativity have to say about the relationship between risk and creativity.
A. From Economics to Creativity
The standard view of intellectual property emphasizes economic
constraints on the creation and distribution of inventions and expressive
works: IP law is thought to influence creators’ incentives to invest time
and money in the production of certain kinds of public goods.74 Creators
may lack access to the capital required to build and test prototypes or pay
a film crew. Creators may also require pecuniary motivation to spend
their time producing information, or to acquire the human capital needed
to do so successfully. IP law helps answer the economic question why
anyone would invest in these activities.
The production of inventions and expressive works is, however,
subject to multiple constraints. And perhaps the most fundamental
constraint is the creativity of the inventor or artist—without that
creativity, there is simply no invention or expressive work to speak of.
IP might be the best way to facilitate the acquisition of capital to produce
inventions and expressive works, or to internalize the benefits of those
works, but still be undesirable on net because it stifles the very creativity
required to produce them. So even if IP answers some economic
questions, at its core, IP might also or better be understood as answering
social and psychological questions: viewed through this lens, IP scholars
must ask whether intellectual property promotes the social and
psychological phenomenon we know as creativity.75
Promoting creativity is, of course, not coextensive with producing
inventions and expressive works. Some inventions may be the result
more of technical expertise than creativity. Similarly, the expressive
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 27, at 37–41 (describing the basic economic case for
copyright law); id. at 294–97 (describing the basic economic case for patent law).
75. See Fromer, supra note 8, at 1457–59 (arguing that “it is crucial to explore the psychology
of creativity to learn . . . how the stimulation of creativity relates to and ought to influence
intellectual property laws”). There is a considerable and growing overlap between economics and
psychology. See generally Lex Borghans et al., The Economics and Psychology of Personality
Traits, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 972 (2008) (exploring “the interface between personality
psychology and economics”).
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works that copyright law protects include everything from highly creative
novels to routine news articles. Still, creativity is a crucial ingredient in
much of the work that IP seeks to motivate. And that makes urgent the
need to understand how IP affects creativity.76
B. Theories of Creativity and Risk
To generate hypotheses about the potential responses of creators to IP
risk, I turn to the interdisciplinary study of creativity. The modern field
of creativity research traces its origin to J.P. Guilford’s 1950 presidential
address to the American Psychological Association.77 Researchers in this
tradition consistently identify two criteria as essential to creativity:
novelty and appropriateness.78 Novelty requires that the thing be new.79
Appropriateness demands that the thing be suitable or valuable for some
purpose, so as to distinguish the creative from the randomly or
nonsensically new.80 While this definition of creativity masks some
nuances and controversies, it captures the core of the phenomenon.81
Today, creativity theories are commonly divided among the four P’s:
person, process, product, and place.82 Person theories try to identify the
76. Fromer, supra note 8, at 1457–59.
77. J.P. Guilford, Creativity, 5 AM. PSYCHOL. 444 (1950). For examples Guilford’s influence,
see Jonathan A. Plucker & Joseph S. Renzulli, Psychometric Approaches to the Study of Human
Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 35, 36 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999); Frank Barron &
David M. Harrington, Creativity, Intelligence, and Personality, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 439, 440
(1981); see also Mark A. Runco & Robert S. Albert, Creativity Research: A Historical View, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 3 (James C. Kaufman & Robert J. Sternberg eds.,
2010) (providing an overview of work leading up to Guilford’s address).
78. Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, The Concept of Creativity: Prospects and Paradigms,
in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY, supra note 77, at 3, 3; Gregory J. Feist, A Meta-Analysis of
Personality in Scientific and Artistic Creativity, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 290, 290–
91 (1998) (noting thirty years of consensus on the definition of creativity); Dean Keith Simonton,
Taking the U.S. Patent Office Criteria Seriously: A Quantitative Three-Criterion Creativity
Definition and its Implications, 24 CREATIVITY RES. J. 97, 97 (2012) (“By far the most common
statement entails some version of the two-criterion definition: Creativity requires (a) novelty or
originality and (b) utility or usefulness.”).
79. Sternberg & Lubart, supra note 78, at 3.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Creativity researchers have, for example, questioned the suitability of a novelty requirement
for technological work and an appropriateness requirement for artistic work. Mark Batey & Adrian
Furnham, Creativity, Intelligence, and Personality: A Critical Review of the Scattered Literature,
132 GENETIC SOC. & GEN. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 355, 360 (2006). For an introduction to some
of these complexities, see id. at 358–61 (describing, inter alia, the disagreement about whether it
is enough that a product “be new for the creator,” or instead, that the “product is new and useful”
to society).
82. Id. at 358; Aaron Kozbelt et al., Theories of Creativity, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
CREATIVITY, supra note 77, at 20, 24–25. The distinctions drawn by this taxonomy are not
inviolable. Systems theories of creativity, for example, “take the view that creativity is best
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distinguishing characteristics of creative individuals.83 Process theories
examine the mental mechanisms typical of creative thinking.84 Product
theories concentrate on the results of creative work—books, films, new
light bulbs, and novel chemical substances.85 And place theories seek to
understand the contexts in which creativity commonly occurs.86
Person, process, and place theories could help answer this Article’s
core question: How does IP risk affect creativity in the fields covered by
copyright and patent law? (I set aside product theories because of their
focus on why a given object or idea is deemed creative, as opposed to
how or why such an object or idea is produced). As described in detail
below, prevailing creativity theories—whether emphasizing person,
process, or place—suggest that there may be a positive relationship
between risk and creativity.
1. The Creative Person
Creative person theories posit that creativity is best understood as a
function of particular personality and intellectual characteristics.87 One
of those characteristics may be a preference for risk because, insofar as
conceptualized not as a single entity, but as emerging from a complex system with interacting
subcomponents—all of which must be taken into account for a rich, meaningful, and valid
understanding of creativity.” Kozbelt et al., supra, at 38–40. Nor are these categories necessarily
exhaustive—Dean Simonton (persuasion) and Mark Runco (performance/potential) have each
proposed adding an additional “P” to the traditional four. Id. at 24–25. Furthermore, creativity
researchers sometimes distinguish among different degrees of creativity. So-called little-c
creativity refers to the minor sorts of novel and appropriate things produced on a day-to-day basis
by all individuals. Id. at 23. Big-C creativity, on the other hand, refers to the major contributions
associated with people like Picasso. Id. In between lies Pro-C creativity, which covers the work
done by creative professionals—like those that make a living as artists and engineers—that do not
reach the lofty heights that Picasso or the Wright Brothers did. Id. at 24. Pro-C is of primary
interest to IP scholars, encompassing as it does the kind of contributions covered by copyright and
patent law. But at least some little-c and Big-C also lie within our area of interest, and surely some
Pro-C also lies without. These distinctions, however, do not often arise in existing theoretical and
empirical assessments of the influence of risk on creativity, so for the moment note only that these
distinctions can in principle be applied in subsequent testing of the hypotheses articulated below.
83. Batey & Furnham, supra note 81, at 357–58; Kozbelt et al., supra note 82, at 25.
84. Batey & Furnham, supra note 81, at 358; Kozbelt et al., supra note 82, at 24.
85. Teresa M. Amabile, The Social Psychology of Creativity: A Componential
Conceptualization, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 358 (1983); Batey & Furnham,
supra note 81, at 358; Kozbelt et al., supra note 82, at 24–25.
86. Batey & Furnham, supra note 81, at 358; Kozbelt et al., supra note 82, at 25.
87. While modern creativity research began with the search for the creative person, there are
perhaps no more pure creative person theories in the sense that no serious theory of creativity holds
that a creative personality is the sole determinant of creativity. Cf. Amabile, supra note 85, at 358
(suggesting in 1983 that “[p]erhaps a social psychology of creativity has failed to develop in part
because empirical creativity research has long been dominated by a trait approach, an attempt to
precisely identify the personality differences between creative and noncreative individuals”).
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creative work is systematically riskier than uncreative work, an individual
who prefers risk may more readily pursue creative kinds of work. That
is, creative people might have a preference for creative work in part
because they enjoy the risk with which it is associated.88 Alternatively,
the personality characteristics that facilitate creativity may also
predispose individuals to prefer risk, even if risk preference has no direct
role in creativity.89 For example, a taste for novelty may underlie both a
preference for creative work (to the extent that more creative work
involves more novelty than less creative work) and a preference for risk
(to the extent that novel situations are systematically riskier than familiar
ones).
One version of this view of creativity—centered on personality and
intellectual characteristics—can be found in Robert Sternberg and
Thomas Lubart’s investment model of creativity.90 This approach
models creativity as the investment of resources in projects, where the
basic strategy is to buy low (i.e., choose unknown or disfavored projects)
and sell high (i.e., move on to other projects once an initial one has been
appropriately recognized).91 Sternberg and Lubart argue that creativity
results from the interaction of six resources: “intellectual processes,
knowledge, intellectual styles, personality, motivation, and
environmental context.”92 These resources are of varying importance
across different domains of creative work, such that creativity is neither
a domain-general skill (i.e., applicable throughout the arts and sciences),
nor a domain-specific one (i.e., applicable to only one art form or one
technological field); instead, creativity results from the confluence of
these resources in a particular context.93
A willingness to take risks is one of the five attributes that Sternberg

88. I do not mean to suggest that individuals are either “creative” or “uncreative”; instead, each
individual might have more or less creative potential that might be expressed to greater or lesser
degrees in particular contexts. In other words, individuals might fall on a continuum of creativity,
rather than within one of two categorical types. I use phrases like “creative person” and “uncreative
person” for expositional convenience—those phrases should be understood to refer to different
ends of the continuum, rather than categorical distinctions.
89. See Plucker & Renzulli, supra note 77, at 42 (identifying “risk taking” as one among several
“personality correlates of creative behavior” without articulating an explicit role for risk taking in
creative activity).
90. Todd I. Lubart & Robert J. Sternberg, An Investment Approach to Creativity: Theory and
Data, in THE CREATIVE COGNITION APPROACH 271, 276–77 (S.M. Smith et al. eds., 1995)
(arguing that “different aspects of creativity are best studied together”).
91. Id. at 271.
92. Id. at 271; Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, An Investment Theory of Creativity and Its
Development, 34 HUM. DEV. 1, 4 (1991).
93. Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 276.
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and Lubart deem “essential” to the creative personality.94 Individuals
must often choose between more creative and less creative options.95 For
example, an artist may need to make choices about topic, development,
materials, and style; each choice might present a more creative option and
a less creative one.96 More creative options are associated with higher
risk because their novelty frustrates efforts to predict outcomes; less
creative options are associated with lower risk because the possible
outcomes are better established and therefore easier to predict.97 In this
framework, a willingness to take risks is a personality trait that influences
which options an individual tends to choose: the creative, risky ones or
the routine, safe ones.98
Sternberg and Lubart include both internal rewards (like the feeling of
competence when a creative task is completed) and external ones (like
financial bonuses) as possible gains from creative work.99 Moreover,
creative work can result in losses like criticism or wasted time.100 Thus,
although the risks associated with creativity “tend to be intellectual ones,”
they “carry social and monetary ramifications.”101 The taste for risk
identified by Sternberg and Lubart as essential to creativity therefore
includes a willingness to take not only intellectual risks, but also, at least,
social and financial ones.102
2. The Creative Process
Creative process theories view particular cognitive mechanisms as the
essential determinants of creativity.103 The premise is that these
mechanisms produce creative ideas, which lead to creative products.
Both risk and creativity require the mind to process the unpredictable; it
is therefore possible that the cognitive mechanisms used when engaged

94. Id. at 274.
95. Id. at 291.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. (proposing that “[w]illingness to take risk, a personality trait, guides” whether a
person chooses a “low risk-low payoff” route or a “high risk-high payoff” one). This is not to say
that a creative person will always pursue high-risk options; instead, the theory predicts that
“creators balance risk with diversification,” pursuing some high-risk options and some low-risk
ones. Sternberg & Lubart, supra note 92, at 14.
99. Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 274.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 291.
102. They also speculate that the “general aversion to risk” seen in general decision-making
studies might therefore “partially account[] for the infrequency of creative performance.” Id. at
291.
103. Kozbelt et al., supra note 82, at 24.

22_SAWICKI_PDF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

4/18/17 3:24 PM

Risky IP

105

in creative work are related to those used when confronting risk. On this
view, people who are relatively better able to deal with risk will also be
relatively more capable of creativity.
As an example, consider Dean Keith Simonton’s chance-configuration
theory.104 Simonton’s theory posits that the creative process begins with
chance permutations of mental elements; these chance permutations are
fleeting combinations of facts, ideas, concepts, and so on, which provide
the variation necessary for creativity.105 When a chance permutation
“significantly augment[s] the efficiency of thought,” it is retained as what
the theory labels a stable “configuration.”106
Individuals then
communicate configurations to communities, which accept and preserve
them (or not) as a result of social and cultural factors.107 Creativity is the
production and acceptance of these newly adopted configurations.
The chance-configuration theory proposes that risk preferences are
part of an individual’s cognitive style, and a person’s cognitive style will
influence her creativity by rendering her more or less suited to the chanceconfiguration process. Thus, Simonton argues that the “capacity to play
with ideas is facilitated by impulsiveness, flexibility, independence, and
a risk-taking disposition.”108 While Simonton’s focus is on intellectual
risks,109 it is possible that intellectual risk taking is correlated with risk
taking in other domains.110
3. The Creative Place
Place theories explain creativity as an interaction between an
individual and the social environment in which such an individual is
attempting to perform a creative task.111 Creators run the risk that they
might fail to produce creative products, or that society might reject those
products. As a result, a creative place theory could indicate that creators
need to be especially willing or able to run such risks. But unlike a
104. See generally DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, SCIENTIFIC GENIUS: A PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
(1988). As with Sternberg and Lubart’s investment theory, Simonton’s is not a pure process theory
in the sense of treating processes as the only elements relevant to creativity. Simonton’s work also
considers the influence of person and place factors. Id. at 41–59, 107–134. Still, his chanceconfiguration theory is a process theory to the extent that it emphasizes the role of cognitive
mechanisms in creativity.
105. Id. at 6–8.
106. Id. at 8–16.
107. Id. at 16–21.
108. Id. at 43.
109. Id.
110. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing research regarding whether risk preferences are domain
specific).
111. Kozbelt et al., supra note 82, at 25.
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creative person theory—which would propose that this willingness or
ability is a function of individual, relatively stable, personality traits—a
creative place theory would posit that creators’ willingness or ability to
run such risks depends on the interaction between such traits and the
social environment in which creators act.112 In a creative place theory, a
single person may be likely to produce creative work in one environment
and unlikely to do so in another because of factors external to the person.
The most prominent example of this approach is Teresa Amabile’s
componential theory.113 The theory explains creativity as a function of
three components, each of which is necessary to creativity: domainrelevant skills, creativity-relevant skills, and task motivation.114
Amabile’s central contribution was to emphasize the influence of task
motivation on creativity. Task motivation is an individual’s desire to
engage with a task or activity, and can be driven by intrinsic factors or
extrinsic ones.115
Intrinsic factors derive from the individual’s
engagement with the task itself.116 Extrinsic factors are those that arise
from the context in which the individual works on the task.117
The links between creativity and risk in Amabile’s theory are more
complex than the simple positive relationship proposed by creative
person theories. Risk is perhaps best understood as an extrinsic factor
influencing task motivation.118 Under Amabile’s original theory,
extrinsic factors invariably undermine intrinsic motivation,119 so risk
would then have a negative impact on creativity. Subsequent work has
revealed, however, that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can be additive,
112. Id.
113. For the seminal paper introducing Amabile’s componential theory, see generally Amabile,
supra note 85. For the full elaboration of the theory, see generally TERESA M. AMABILE,
CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996).
114. Amabile, supra note 85, at 357. Domain-relevant skills are those that pertain to the subject
matter of the creative work (consider a visual artist’s ability to physically control paintbrushes and
perceive colors, or an electrical engineer’s knowledge of Ohm’s Law or Boolean logic). Id. at 363–
64. Creativity-relevant skills are the cognitive and personality characteristics relating to things like
independence and risk taking. Id.
115. AMABILE, supra note 113, at 108–09; Amabile, supra note 85, at 365–66; Beth A.
Hennessey & Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity, 61 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 569, 581 (2010).
116. AMABILE, supra note 113, at 108–09.
117. Id. To summarize Amabile’s original core proposition: “[T]he intrinsically motivated state
is conducive to creativity, whereas the extrinsically motivated state is detrimental.” Id. at 107; see
also Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 115, at 581.
118. Amabile, supra note 85, at 369, 373.
119. AMABILE, supra note 113, at 107 (arguing that “the intrinsically motivated state is
conducive to creativity” and “the extrinsically motivated state is detrimental”); Hennessey &
Amabile, supra note 115, at 581 (summarizing the early view that “as extrinsic motivators and
constraints were imposed, intrinsic motivation (and creativity) would necessarily decrease”).
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depending on the particular nature of the extrinsic factor.120 In Amabile’s
revised theory,121 risk would therefore have a highly context-specific
influence on task motivation and, by extension, creativity: in some
instances, risk will have a positive effect, and in others, a negative one.
Amabile’s theory also suggests potential insights for how personality
and the environment interact to affect creativity. First, Amabile
recognizes that a “personality disposition related to . . . “risk taking” may
be an individual-difference variable contributing to creativity.122 This
willingness to take risks can mediate the influence of intrinsic motivation
on creativity.123 From this perspective, Amabile’s theory points toward
the possibility that creative individuals differ from the general population
in their responses to risks of all kinds.
Second, Amabile proposes that creative individuals are more able than
less creative individuals to avoid the ordinarily negative effects of
extrinsic constraints.124 From this perspective, risk is an extrinsic factor
that can reduce task motivation, but because creative people can easily
ignore extrinsic factors, they are relatively unaffected by it. And
intrinsically based task motivation can then enhance “a willingness to
take risks with [the] particular [creative] task.”125
As an example, imagine a composer must produce a creative melody
for a musical, but will be fired if the producer deems it inadequate. For
most individuals, this context would reduce task motivation and thereby
make it difficult to produce the creative melody. But the effect of this
kind of extrinsic factor may be less severe (or simply non-existent) for
more creative individuals because such individuals are better able to
focus on the intrinsic pleasure they derive from the task itself. So a
120. Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 115, at 581. For more on the influence of extrinsic
factors on intrinsic motivation, see Beth A. Hennessey, The Creativity-Motivation Connection, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY, supra note 77, at 342, 348–53 (describing the
influence of Self-Determination Theory on social psychology of creativity research); Richard M.
Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation,
Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 68, 73 (2000).
121. See AMABILE, supra note 113, at 115–18 (revising the original theory to account for
evidence showing additive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivators in particular contexts).
122. Amabile, supra note 85, at 372.
123. Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 115, at 581.
124. Amabile, supra note 85, at 366; see AMABILE, supra note 113, at 92 (proposing that “an
individual’s ability to cognitively minimize the salience of such extrinsic constraints[] might
influence task motivation”). This ability to ignore extrinsic factors may be applicable only with
respect to particular activities or it may be a general personality characteristic. Amabile, supra note
85, at 372.
125. Id. at 368; see also Todd Dewett, Linking Intrinsic Motivation, Risk Taking, and Employee
Creativity in an R&D Environment, 37 R&D MGMT. 197, 199 (2007) (“[I]t has become commonly
accepted that intrinsically motivated behaviors result in risk taking.”).
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creative individual’s task motivation may be (relatively) unaffected by
the risk of getting fired if the producer is not satisfied, and she is
accordingly able to produce creative melodies just as easily in response
to the producer’s ultimatum as without it. On this view, legal, financial,
and other risks associated with the IP system may be the sorts of extrinsic
factors that creative people can “tune out” better than others.
To be sure, not every creativity theory points toward a positive
relationship between creativity and risk. In many, risk simply has no
bearing on the theory’s central concerns, and we might therefore
conclude that, to the extent the theory is a useful way to understand
creativity, it tells us that there is nothing special about creators’ responses
to IP risk.126 Still, many of the leading creativity theories indicate that
the relationship between risk and creativity is generally positive. The
next step is to understand how IP risk in particular affects creativity.
III. THE IMPACT OF IP RISK ON CREATIVITY
This Part first frames the analysis of IP risk by elaborating on a central
question for IP scholars: How does the impact of risk on creativity affect
the comparison between IP and alternative mechanisms for stimulating
technology and the arts? Building on the theories of creativity described
above, this Part then articulates three hypotheses regarding the effect of
IP risk on creativity.
A. IP, Prizes, Grants, and Other Tools
The big empirical question IP scholars must answer is whether
intellectual property rights, in fact and on net, stimulate the production of
inventions and expressive works.127 On the standard view, artists and
inventors underinvest in producing art and inventions because such works
are public goods.128 IP rights make these public goods excludable,
126. See generally MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL
EXPERIENCE (1990) (arguing that creativity is a product of an intensely focused mental state);
HOWARD E. GRUBER, DARWIN ON MAN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY
(1981) (arguing that creativity is best understood as the result of evolving subsystems of
knowledge, purpose, and affect within the creative person).
127. Although this question has long resisted efforts to approach an answer, recent work has
begun to make progress. For an overview, see generally John M. Golden et al., The Path of IP
Studies: Growth, Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757 (2014). This is the big question
within the prevailing normative framework; we might, of course, ask whether this is the right
normative framework and that would naturally be a pretty big question too. For a notable recent
exploration of this question, see generally MERGES, supra note 26.
128. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 27, at 37–41; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (noting that “legal restraints on
patentable inventions are justifiable if they offer a net benefit to society, trading the disutility of
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thereby making it possible for creators to appropriate the value of their
work.129 But IP rights have a well-known downside: they enable creators
to price their goods above marginal cost.130 As a result, IP forces a
difficult tradeoff between static inefficiency—limiting consumption of
goods that have negligible marginal costs—and dynamic efficiency—
providing incentives for creators to produce such goods in the first
instance.131
It is hard enough to determine whether this tradeoff is worthwhile on
its own terms. The task for IP scholars is still more complicated because
IP is just one of several mechanisms for stimulating work in technology
and the arts. Even if we agree that the incentive thesis has identified a
significant problem—the need to provide rewards for creative work—we
need not agree that the ideal solution is to offer rewards in the form of
exclusive rights.132 For example, the government can directly employ
inventors and artists, paying them a salary in exchange for their ongoing
inventive and artistic work. It can provide grants to inventors and artists
for work on more specific projects that the government deems desirable.
The government may also award prizes to those who satisfy particular
criteria. And the government may indirectly encourage investments in
technology and the arts through tax policy, or otherwise regulate these
fields so as to influence the costs of producing, copying, and distributing
inventions and expressive works.133 The big empirical question is
accordingly a relative one: How much better is IP—or in what
circumstances is it better—than other tools we could use to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts”?134
restricted output and higher prices for the greater social utility of inventions that might otherwise
not be produced”); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 25, at 12–13 (relying on the public good
characteristics of innovative products to justify patent law).
129. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 27, at 37–41, 294–97.
130. William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Productive
Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2056–57 (2014); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole
Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 710, 736 (2011).
131. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 990 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 916 (1990).
132. For just a few examples from a large literature discussing alternatives, see Carroll, supra
note 4, at 1369; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 267; see generally Michael Abramowicz,
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003). The list that follows is drawn from Carroll,
supra note 4, at 1369–70.
133. An example of this policy mechanism can be found in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act’s prohibition of technology that circumvents measures taken to prevent copying of copyrighted
works. Id.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For an argument that the Constitution might limit recourse
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While there are different sources of IP risk, I focus in this Part on the
risk related to the financial value of IP rights and its alternatives. The
starkest comparison might be between IP rights and salaries. When an
inventor or artist relies on IP rights to justify working on a creative
project, she will not know how much the resulting IP rights will be worth.
Conversely, when an inventor or artist is paid a salary for her work on a
creative project, she will know with some precision how much she will
receive.
The impact of risk itself will be obscured in real-world settings because
IP rights might not only be riskier than salaries, but also provide
significantly greater incentives. Simply put, IP rights might reward
individuals for creative performance in (rough) proportion to the value of
their contributions, while salaries might reward individuals independent
of the value of their contributions. If so, then IP rights might outperform
salaries simply because IP rights give creators some reason to create,
while salaries give them none.
This possibility, however, depends on the particular conditions under
which the individual receives the IP rights or the salaries. For example,
imagine a salary set equal to the expected value of the IP rights
corresponding to the creator’s output, but contingent on the creator’s
observed effort.135 In such a scenario, the salary would provide the
to other solutions, see Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations,
61 DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012). There are also smaller but still important IP questions for which the
risk-creativity relationship matters. We could imagine particular implementations of IP law that
involve less risk than does the actual implementation we have chosen. Our actual implementation
of IP comprises many unclear doctrines, including (among other things) a difficult-to-predict fair
use doctrine; indeed, there have been countless proposals to reduce the risk associated with the fair
use doctrine. See generally Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right
to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149 (1998); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85
N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139,
175–78 (2009); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483 (2007). To be sure, these proposals often have multiple effects, usually not only reducing
risk, but also making it possible for individuals to avoid liability entirely. Nevertheless, from a
conceptual standpoint, it is possible to distinguish the (potential) harms flowing from risk, and the
(potential) harms flowing from the imposition of liability. Fair use is a classic example of a flexible
standard, and a move to a more rule-like version of fair use could, at least in principle, reduce risk
while keeping constant the expected liability to which the documentarian (and other individuals
relying on fair use) would be exposed. See Fagundes, supra, at 175 (describing fair use as an
example of a standard in copyright law that could be converted into more rule-like form); Horowitz,
supra note 63, at 357-59 (distinguishing between effects of copyright fair use proposals on risk and
effects of those proposals on the scope of entitlements). The overall policy choices here involve
difficult tradeoffs between initial creators and follow-on creators. Peter S. Menell & Ben
Depoorter, Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 53, 74
(2014). To choose among these options, though, we need an accurate understanding of the impact
of IP risk on creativity.
135. This assumption is not unrealistic—employment is ordinarily at will, and an employee in
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creator with an incentive to create because, unless she provides an
appropriate quantity of (observable) effort, she will not receive the salary.
The two rewards would still differ, however, with respect to their risk
profiles—the salary will equal a fixed amount (equivalent to the expected
value of the IP rights), while the IP rights will range over some set of
possible values. And that difference in risk profile may itself influence
the creator’s response. Of course, even in this scenario, IP rights might
provide greater incentives if their value is more closely tied to the
creator’s actual effort. Still, the point is simply that it is possible to
conceptually distinguish the influence of incentives on creativity from the
influence of risk.
We might then ask the question: If society had a dollar to spend on
either an IP system or on a salary for a creator, which would return the
highest creative value?136 There are many reasons we might get more
from that dollar by spending it on a copyright system instead of a
salary.137 But hold everything else constant, and focus here on one key
dimension of the comparison: How does the risk associated with IP affect
the creativity required to produce inventions and expressive works?
B. Hypotheses Regarding IP Risk and Creativity
This Part draws on leading creativity theories to generate three core
hypotheses regarding the effect of IP risk on creativity. For each
hypothesis, this Part articulates its theoretical basis, provides an
a position demanding creativity will lose her job and, by extension, her salary, if she fails to
perform. As a practical matter, it may be impossible to observe creative effort. But suppose it is
at least possible to observe enough to provide the creator an incentive to work. See Casey &
Sawicki, supra note 31, at 1702–06 (describing problems of and solutions to unobservability of
creative effort).
136. Although it is easier to see how society would “spend” on salaries, we can think of the
copyright system as forcing society to incur a set of costs—ranging from the costs of passing laws,
establishing courts to enforce them, and bearing deadweight losses from limited access—and those
costs are the dollars society “spends” on the copyright system. Of course, there are hard questions
here regarding, for example, the ability to make marginal spending decisions given the fixed costs
involved in running a copyright system: 17 U.S.C. § 101 is written, after all.
137. See Carroll, supra note 4, at 1373–79 (describing the “consensus view among
economically-oriented commentators” that IP rights are better than prize systems because the IP
system “is driven by the marginally superior private information that innovators enjoy”); Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 3, at 327–33 (arguing that research and development tax incentives can, like
patents and unlike government-administered prizes, rely on private information about the costs and
benefits of particular research investments); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of
Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1908–21 (2013) (arguing that
inventions exist on a continuum of excludability that is not correlated with social value, and that
this undermines Harold Demsetz’s argument that patents are superior to government prizes and
grants because of their ability to “make use of private information about the value of prospective
inventions”).
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illustration of what it would mean for the hypothesis to be true, reviews
existing empirical work relevant to the hypothesis, and analyzes what it
would mean for IP law if subsequent empirical work supports the
hypothesis.
In developing the hypotheses, I focus on a stylized world for analytical
clarity. Although I have already adverted to some of the assumptions
underlying this world, I state them explicitly here to clarify when and
how they need to be accounted for in subsequent empirical research.
First, I assume that the effects of risk are consistent across risk domain—
that is, individuals respond to health risks in the same way that they
respond to financial or social risks.138 Second, I assume that the
relationship between risk and creativity is the same regardless of the
domain of creative work—risk influences creativity in similar ways
regardless of whether we are evaluating creativity in literature, film, drug
development, software design, or nanotechnology.139 Third, I assume
that creators are operating independently and interacting directly with the
relevant risks—in other words, there are no firms or other
intermediaries.140 Fourth, I assume that differences between quantitative
risk and uncertainty do not matter to the analysis.141 Finally, I assume
that contextual variables do not affect the influence of risk on creativity—
it does not matter, for example, whether risk flows from possible upside
outcomes or downside outcomes.142
Although I explore these assumptions more fully in Part IV, the first
and third assumptions bear a bit more elaboration here. The creativity
theories discussed in the preceding Part focus, naturally enough, on
creative risks. An engineer, for example, cannot be certain whether her
proposed design for a battery will be efficient in powering a cellular
phone. The novelty of her design will frustrate efforts to predict whether
it will work. And it is how creators respond to this kind of risk that forms
the primary basis for the theoretically positive relationship between risk
138. See infra Part IV.A.2 (relaxing the assumption of uniform responses across risk domain).
139. See infra Part IV.A.1 (acknowledging plausibility of some variation across domains of
creative work and within particular domains, but also describing theoretical support for domainindependent effects). Relatedly, I assume that the relationship between risk and creativity is the
same at all levels of creative work within a given domain—that is, all authors respond to risk in the
same way, whether they are Nobel Prize winners or pulp novelists.
140. See infra Part IV.A.3 (explaining that intermediaries often shift risk away from creators,
and raise the possibility that such arrangements might have socially undesirable implications).
141. See infra Part IV.A.4 (describing the need to account for the difference between
quantitative risk and uncertainty in empirical investigations).
142. See infra Part IV.A.5 (identifying several behavioral economics findings, including but not
limited to the framing effects described in Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, that may
influence empirical research design).
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and creativity. One might therefore question the relevance for IP law of
proposed links in creativity theory between risk and creativity.
But even focusing solely on the risks associated with creative work
reveals that the positive relationship between risk and creativity might
not be limited to creative risks; it also plausibly extends to things like
financial or social risks. Indeed, the potential outcomes of designing a
new kind of cellular phone battery include not only the possibilities that
the battery will or will not work, but also that it will be a financial success
or failure, or that the engineer may enjoy the acclaim or suffer the ridicule
of her peers.143 In other words, creative work entails not only creative
risk, but also at least financial and social risk, and creativity theories
frequently consider those kinds of risks as well as ones that might be
understood as more narrowly related to the creative work.
The emphasis in this Part is on IP’s financial risk—that is, the risk
associated with the value of an IP right—because this is the essential and
inescapable IP risk. Part IV extends this analysis to other kinds of IP risk.
For now, the important points are simply that (1) creative risks are the
primary, but not exclusive, basis for the positive relationship between risk
and creativity proposed by creativity theorists; and (2) this relationship
may extend to other kinds of risks.
This project is also complicated by the fact that creators rarely
experience the effects of IP directly. Instead, creators often interact with
the IP system through a number of intermediaries.144 But we should not
treat these arrangements as exogenous to the IP system. Creators may
enter into these kinds of arrangements to finance and distribute their work
because, among many other things, we have an IP system that relies on
ex post rewards as incentives. Moreover, technological changes may
change the role of intermediaries, and the IP system may then need to
respond in kind. We should therefore ask whether such arrangements are
desirable and, depending on the answer to that question, structure the IP
system to facilitate or discourage them.
For the analysis in this Article, this means that we should first
understand how creators would respond to IP risk directly before we
determine how creators’ common (though by no means universal)
143. See Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 274 (identifying the possible gains and losses of
creative work).
144. Because employers typically acquire their employees’ patent rights, and then compensate
the employees in some manner (whether as part of their base compensation or through bonuses tied
to the number or value of patents associated with an inventor’s work), inventors often experience
the effects of the patent system only indirectly. Similarly, artists in a range of fields usually interact
only indirectly with the copyright system; producers and distributors of artistic works—movie
studios, record labels, and book publishers own, enforce, and collect royalties on copyrights, which
they then distribute (or not) to the actual creators.
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arrangements with intermediaries affect those responses. Doing so will
enable us to evaluate the desirability of those arrangements by comparing
the impacts of IP risk on creativity in a world in which creators interact
with IP directly to the impacts of IP risk on creativity in a world in which
creators interact with IP indirectly.
1. Creative Individuals Prefer Risk to Certainty
The first hypothesis is that creative individuals prefer risk to
certainty.145 Recall that person theories of creativity, like Sternberg and
Lubart’s investment theory, hold that some people have distinct
personality characteristics that facilitate creativity.146 The intuition is that
because more creative work is systematically riskier than less creative
work, personality characteristics that lead people to make riskier choices
will lead them to make more creative ones too. One such personality
characteristic is a simple preference for risk over certainty.147 Similarly,
process theories indicate that creative individuals prefer risk as part of an
overall cognitive style that renders them suited to creative thinking.148
Thus, this hypothesis proposes that, all else equal, creative people faced
with two options will prefer the one associated with more risk over the
one associated with less risk.
Suppose, for example, that Claire is a musician. She is preparing for a
concert and must decide which songs to play. Claire could play a wellknown song that she has played many times before, like The Beatles’
“Hey Jude.”149 Or she could write and play a new song; call it “Venus

145. Such a preference for risk is most plausibly understood as occurring only over some
interval because it would otherwise imply that the utility function is potentially infinite. Infinite
utility is, to put it lightly, unlikely. See Robert J. Aumann, The St. Petersburg Paradox: A
Discussion of Some Recent Comments, 14 J. ECON. THEORY 443, 444 (1977) (arguing that the St.
Petersburg Paradox, which shows that people are unwilling to pay infinite amounts for a lottery of
infinite expected value, is best resolved by concluding “that utility must be bounded,” especially
because the lottery outcome could include “religious, aesthetic, or emotional experiences”); but see
CADDYSHACK (Orion Pictures 1980) (“So we finish the 18th and he’s gonna stiff me. And I say,
‘Hey, Lama, hey, how about a little something, you know, for the effort, you know.’ And he says,
‘Oh, uh, there won’t be any money, but when you die, on your deathbed, you will receive total
consciousness.’ So I got that goin’ for me, which is nice.”). This hypothesis is therefore more
precisely understood as saying that creative people prefer risk over some interval or for certain
decisions, not that their utility functions are convex everywhere. For ease of exposition, though,
the text will refer simply to the hypothesis that creators prefer risk.
146. Supra Part II.B.
147. Id.; see also Nigel Nicholson et al., Personality and Domain-Specific Risk Taking, 8 J.
RISK RES. 157, 170 (2005) (recognizing that some individuals find risks “attractive because they
stimulate and excite”).
148. Supra Part II.B.
149. THE BEATLES, Hey Jude, on HEY JUDE (Apple Records 1968).
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Fly.” If she plays “Hey Jude,” she has a pretty good idea how the
audience will react. But if she chooses to write and play “Venus Fly,”
she has very little idea how the audience will receive it—the audience
may give her a standing ovation or boo her off the stage. One of the
things that Claire, as a creative person, might find appealing about
“Venus Fly” is precisely this risk regarding how the audience will
react.150
Perhaps surprisingly, this hypothesis has not been directly tested.
Creativity studies tend to use relative measures of risk preference (i.e.,
how does one individual’s taste for risk compare to another’s) rather than
absolute measures of an individual’s taste for options presenting risk or
certainty.151 While such studies shed light on the second hypothesis—
that creative individuals have greater tolerance for risk than does the
general population—they do not directly inform this first hypothesis—
that creative individuals prefer risk to certainty.152
One indirect line of evidence can be found in the distribution of
rewards in fields requiring creative effort. Skewed reward distributions
are pervasive in the technology and entertainment industries. Surveys of
the value of renewed patents in Germany and the royalties earned by
United States university patents show that a few patents generate
extremely large returns, while most earn modest or negligible amounts.153
150. We can think of Claire’s decision as a choice between the following two options. The first
option is to receive a $10 bill. This is the “Hey Jude” option. The second is a lottery. This is the
“Venus Fly” option. She has a 50 percent chance of winning, in which case she receives $20, and
a 50 percent chance of losing, in which case she gets nothing. So if this first hypothesis were true,
Claire would choose the lottery because it is characterized by risk, which she prefers to the certainty
of receiving a $10 bill, even though both options have the same ex ante expected value: $10. When
thinking of the decision this way, the risk is posed in terms of quantitative risk. This is not,
however, necessary for purposes of this hypothesis. Posing the example in the form of quantitative
risk helps highlight, however, the possibility that it is the risk itself that the creative person finds
appealing.
151. Infra text accompanying notes 173–180. This tendency mirrors the prevailing approach in
personality psychology. See, e.g., Ronnie L. McGhee et al., The Relation Between Five Factor
Personality Traits and Risk-Taking Behavior in Preadolescents, 3 PSYCHOL. 558, 558 (2012)
(describing a model in which “degrees of risk-taking are a function of self-regulatory aspects of
personality”).
152. If comparative risk preference studies showed either that creative individuals do not differ
from the general population or that such individuals are more risk averse than the general
population, then we would be able to reject this first hypothesis on the basis of that kind of study.
But, as I explain infra, text accompanying notes 173–180, the studies indicate that creative
individuals have greater comparative risk preference, which could be consistent with either the first
or second hypothesis.
153. Scherer, supra note 33, at 7–12 (presenting data regarding patent and copyright
distributions of value, including that approximately 10 percent of a sample of renewed German
patents accounted for 88 percent of the sample’s total value).
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Rewards in the entertainment industries are similarly distributed,
although with less skew than in the technology industries.154 But because
these are observational studies of entire industries, they violate the
assumption that creators directly experience the risk. Intermediaries, like
the universities that own the patents, might smooth out the reward
distributions such that inventors do not experience the skewed
distributions reported in this line of research.155
At least one study, though, avoids this issue. Thomas Astebro has
reported that Canadian independent inventors invest in developing
inventions for which they might have predicted negative expected
returns.156 Because the study focused on independent inventors, it is
consistent with the assumption that creators interact directly with the IP
system, rather than through an organizational filter that converts risky IP
rights into predictable salaries.157 The creators in this study tended to
pursue a lower-valued risky option—developing an invention with
plausibly below zero expected value—rather than a higher-valued certain
one—abandoning the invention and keeping the money that would have
otherwise been spent on development.158 One plausible explanation for
their development of such inventions is that the inventors were risk
seeking.159
Interpreting these studies is, however, complicated. One way to
interpret them is to note that these patterns run contrary to the standard
154. Id. at 12–15.
155. See id. at 20 (contrasting “individual high-technology entrepreneurs,” who may be
skewness-lovers, with “the employed inventor,” who will not reap the outsize rewards at the righthand tail of the distribution).
156. The inventors in this study “behave[d] like buyers of unfair lotteries, where the expected
value is negative but there is a small chance of a large gain.” Thomas Astebro, The Return to
Independent Invention: Evidence of Unrealistic Optimism, Risk Seeking or Skewness Loving?, 113
ECON. J. 226, 227 (2003).
157. The sample likely included individuals who invented on their own account, but also had
other jobs; few appear to have been “professional” inventors because “only 2% submitted more
than one invention for review.” Id. at 228.
158. Id. at 236–37. The study focused on a program at a nonprofit—the Canadian Innovation
Centre (“CIC”)—that serves independent inventors by rating the commercial potential of submitted
inventions. Id. at 227–28 (describing rating system from “A—invention is worth commercialising
by full-time entrepreneur” to “E—unacceptable, strongly advise project termination”). Inventors
pursued development of almost half of the inventions that the CIC rated as either “D—doubtful,
one or more factors strongly unfavourable, advise project termination” or “E—unacceptable,
strongly advise project termination.” Id. at 229 (reporting that 51 percent of those receiving D
grades pursued development efforts, as did 47 percent of those receiving E grades). The pooled
return on inventions with D or E ratings was negative; because the rating was applied before
development, this risk could have been predicted ex ante. Id. at 236–37.
159. Id. at 236–37 (proposing risk seeking, unrealistic optimism, and skewness loving as
potential explanations for the observed behavior).
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IP proposition that creators are risk averse.160 This interpretation depends
on the validity of a revealed preference approach—in other words, taking
the observed choices of individuals as a basis for making inferences about
those individuals’ underlying preferences.161 But it is unclear from
studies regarding the existing distributions of rewards that people are in
fact making what they understand to be risky choices. Perhaps
individuals who enter creative fields underestimate the likelihood that
they will end up on the bottom end of the reward distribution, making the
choice to be an inventor or an artist seem less risky than it actually is;
from this perspective, risky behavior by people performing creative work
is a function of misperception of risk, rather than a function of preference
for risk.162 Or perhaps they enter these fields despite the risks they
present, rather than because of them; if this were true, then we might
prefer incentive mechanisms that reduce the overall risk they face, rather
than those that increase it. Additional empirical work is needed to rule
out (or confirm) these alternative explanations.
If subsequent research demonstrates that this hypothesis—creative
individuals prefer risk to certainty—is true, it would have significant
implications for IP law. Most fundamentally, it would indicate that, all
else equal, we should prefer riskier mechanisms for stimulating creative
work rather than less risky ones. Because patents and copyrights are
inherently risky, a dollar spent on IP rights would buy more creativity
than a dollar spent on salaries for inventors and artists. The conventional
wisdom would therefore be exactly backwards: while IP scholars
typically view risk as a problem limiting the potential benefits of IP,
confirmation of this hypothesis would transform risk into one of IP’s key
advantages over alternative mechanisms for stimulating creativity in
technology and the arts.
This effect might be seen at three margins.163 First, it may be that an
160. Cf. Scherer, supra note 33, at 15 (“If innovation requires investment and investors are risk
averse, how can a highly skew distribution of rewards be conducive to innovation?”).
161. Preferences,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/preferences/ (last updated Sep. 6, 2011).
162. See infra, text accompanying notes 258–259 (distinguishing risk preferences from
optimism bias and overconfidence).
163. Alternatively, we can think of the possible effect of IP on creators as trying to influence
the answers to three questions: (1) should I create a marginal information good?; (2) how much
marginal creativity (or value) should I incorporate into a given informational good?; and (3) what
career path should the marginal employee follow—one which produces marginally more or
marginally fewer informational goods? Note that if creators are making decisions before the salary
is available, it might have an effect similar to a prize because the creator might view the salary as
a potential financial award. Thus, imagine a college freshman deciding whether to major in a field
that promises a salary, upon graduation, of $100,000 per year (with appropriate raises). She might

22_SAWICKI_PDF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

118

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/18/17 3:24 PM

[Vol. 48

individual creator produces a greater quantity of work exceeding some
threshold of creativity in response to IP rewards rather than salaries.
Second, it may be that an individual creator imbues any given work with
more creativity in response to IP rewards rather than salaries. Finally, it
may be that creative individuals more often choose careers presenting
opportunities for creative work when they are compensated with IP rights
for pursuing such careers than when they are compensated with salaries.
It is not clear which of these margins we should focus on—all three of
them might serve IP’s normative aim of stimulating technology and the
arts. Whichever margin we look at, though, this hypothesis suggests that
increasing reliance on IP over alternative mechanisms would serve the
constitutionally prescribed goal of the IP system.
That said, two caveats are in order. First, even if this hypothesis were
true, it need not be true for all degrees of risk. Once the risk in a particular
context exceeds some threshold, creators might prefer less risk rather than
more. It is unlikely, to say the least, that creators would prefer a scenario
in which failure is punished by death and success is rewarded with the
granting of three wishes, over a scenario in which failure is punished by
a $100 fine and success is rewarded with a $10 prize. For any plausible
version of this hypothesis, then, we should expect the effect to hold only
within some range.
Second, this hypothesis may be true only for particular periods in a
creator’s lifetime or career. Perhaps it applies when creators are young
and looking to make a name for themselves, but not when they have a
reputation to protect and a mortgage to pay. Or perhaps it applies when
they are established and want to push their boundaries, but not when they
are just getting started and do not have a financial or reputational safety
net to fall back on. In any event, these possibilities constitute fruitful
areas for empirical analysis.
2. Creative Individuals Have a Greater Tolerance for Risk than the
General Population
The second hypothesis is that creative individuals have a greater
tolerance for risk than does the general population. In Sternberg and
Lubart’s theory, creators “will often balance risks; high-risk projects are

view her choice as equivalent to choosing a major that promises a prize, upon graduation,
equivalent to the discounted present value of her lifetime earnings from the salary. Salaries may,
from this perspective, simply shift risk to an earlier point in time relative to prizes, rather than
eliminate risk entirely. But for purposes of the analysis, suppose that the salary is available
immediately and thereby represents a certain present payment.
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pursued simultaneously or in close succession with low-risk ones.”164
Sternberg and Lubart’s theory therefore does not require that creative
people always prefer risky, creative options—just that they do so more
often than noncreative people do. So although Sternberg and Lubart
identify a willingness to take risks as an “essential” characteristic of the
creative personality,165 this willingness may simply be relative to the
“general aversion to risk [that] partially accounts for the infrequency of
creative performance.”166 Similarly, Simonton’s process theory proposes
that more creative individuals have greater cognitive facility with risk;
this raises the possibility that they will be more comfortable facing risk
than others.167 In other words, while most people have a strong tendency
to prefer certain options rather than riskier ones, creative people might
have only a more modest tendency to do so.168
For an example, return to the choice that Claire, the musician, faced:
Should she sing a standard like “Hey Jude” or write a new song, “Venus
Fly,” and sing that instead? Now imagine that not only Claire, but also
Joe, faced this choice. While Claire is very creative, Joe is more of a
technically accomplished musician than a creative one.169 Both Claire
and Joe will take many factors into consideration when choosing whether
to sing “Hey Jude” or “Venus Fly.” For example, they may each derive
some intrinsic satisfaction from the process of writing a new song—
hearing the melody take shape over time—and from the sense of
ownership that results from creating something new.170 Suppose that
taking account of all factors aside from risk, both Claire and Joe would
prefer to sing “Venus Fly” rather than “Hey Jude.”
Now consider the role that risk could play in each of their decisions.
Joe intensely prefers certainty to risk. This preference is so strong that
164. Sternberg & Lubart, supra note 92, at 14.
165. Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 274.
166. Id. at 291; see also Amabile, supra note 85, at 368 (theorizing that creativity involves a
willingness to take risks).
167. SIMONTON, supra note 104, at 57.
168. See Nicholson et al., supra note 147, at 170 (arguing that most people view risk as
undesirable and simply tolerate it as part of the pursuit of other goals).
169. Of course, the execution of a familiar work may be imbued with varying degrees of
creativity. For examples of creative covers of familiar songs, see JOE COCKER, With a Little Help
from My Friends, on WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS (UMG Recordings 1969); JIMI
HENDRIX, The Star-Spangled Banner, on LIVE AT WOODSTOCK (Sony Music Entertainment 1999);
JANIS JOPLIN, Me and Bobby McGee, on PEARL (Sony BMG 1971); THE CLASH, I Fought the Law,
on THE CLASH (Epic 1979). But stipulate for the hypothetical that in this instance, there is more
creativity associated with writing a new song than covering an existing one.
170. Cf. Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 31 (documenting the tendency of creators
to place a higher value on rights to works they have created than do those who merely own or offer
to buy such rights).
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the certainty associated with singing “Hey Jude” and the risk associated
with singing “Venus Fly” is sufficient to lead Joe to sing “Hey Jude,”
even though he would, setting risk aside, prefer to sing “Venus Fly.”
Claire also prefers certainty to risk, but she has only a slight preference
for certainty, rather than an intense one—she can tolerate more risk than
Joe can. Accordingly, even though the difference in the risk associated
with each song makes this a more difficult choice for Claire, she still
decides she would rather sing “Venus Fly” than “Hey Jude,” even after
taking risk into account. For uncreative people like Joe, risk is so
undesirable that it leads them to pursue uncreative options rather than
otherwise more appealing creative ones. For creative people like Claire,
on the other hand, the undesirability of risk is not enough to lead them to
abandon creative options.171
Existing empirical work provides some support for this hypothesis,
although it is inconclusive.172 One line of research has sought to correlate
comparative risk preference to creativity. An early investigation by John
Glover and Fred Sautter, for example, found that subjects categorized as
high risk takers173 scored higher on two measures of the Torrance Tests
of Creative Thinking (“TTCT”) than did those who were categorized as
low risk takers.174 But the low risk takers scored higher on a third
171. Here, we can think of Claire’s and Joe’s choices in the following terms. Suppose each has
the right to participate in a lottery that has a 50 percent chance of winning $20. Claire and Joe are
then each asked the minimum amount they would accept to sell the right to participate in the lottery.
Selling the right to participate allows Claire and Joe to name the certain value that has a utility
equal to the utility that they would derive from participating in the lottery. Because this second
hypothesis proposes that creative people, like people more generally, prefer certainty to risk, the
minimum acceptable price for both Claire and Joe ought to be less than $10—the expected value
of participating in the lottery. We can furthermore view the difference between the sale price and
$10 as a measure of an individual’s tolerance for risk; the smaller the difference, the more an
individual is willing to take on risk, even if she would prefer certainty. The second hypothesis thus
proposes that Claire would sell her right to participate in the lottery in exchange for (say) $7, while
Joe would be willing to do so for only $5.
172. See, e.g., Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 298 (concluding that “the relationship
between risk taking and creative performance needs to be studied more completely”).
173. The sample comprised sixty-six educational psychology students. John A. Glover & Fred
Sautter, Relation of Four Components of Creativity to Risk-Taking Preferences, 41 PSYCHOL. REP.
227, 228 (1977). Risk preference was measured with the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire, which
asks subjects to choose the lowest quantitative odds they would accept in order to pursue a specified
high risk option in a described scenario. Id. Because risk preference was measured relative to other
subjects in the study, the results could not confirm the first hypothesis—that creative people prefer
risk to certainty—although they are consistent with it. For other early work, see generally D.C.
McClelland, The Calculated Risk: An Aspect of Scientific Performance, in THE 1955 UNIVERSITY
OF UTAH RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF CREATIVE SCIENTIFIC TALENT 96
(Univ. Utah Press 1956); John A. Glover, Risky Shift & Creativity, 5 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY
317 (1977).
174. The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (“TTCT”) instrument is a common test of
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measure of the TTCT, and there were no significant differences in
performance on a fourth measure.175
For more recent work, consider Sternberg and Lubart’s test of their
investment theory.176 Subjects who produced more creative drawings
entered a riskier tournament and made riskier choices in domain-specific
hypothetical scenarios than did those who produced less creative
drawings.177 But there were few correlations with self-reported items of
risky behavior.178 And there were no statistically significant results
relating performance on a creative writing task to any measure of risk
preference.179 Efforts to correlate relative risk preference to creativity
have thus produced only mixed results so far.180
Another line of research has tried to correlate creativity to more general
personality characteristics,181 some of which have, in turn, been related
to comparative risk preferences. The seminal paper is George Feist’s
meta-analysis of eighty-three studies of the creative personality.182 Feist
explains that “a consistent and clear portrait of the creative personality in
science and art has emerged: Creative people are more autonomous,
creativity. Hennessey, supra note 120, at 343. High risk takers scored higher on the flexibility and
originality measures of the TTCT, low risk takers scored higher on elaboration, and there was no
significant difference in scores on fluency. Glover & Sautter, supra note 173, at 229.
175. See id. (concluding that “[a]pparently risk taking is a function of some aspects of creative
ability but the number of subjects is as yet too small to draw conclusions”).
176. Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 298. These tests are more precisely understood as
measuring risk behavior; inferences about underlying preferences drawn from such behavior are
therefore subject to caveats similar to those noted supra, text accompanying notes 160–162.
177. Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 295–96. Creative performance was measured using
a variant of Amabile’s consensual assessment technique that employed peer rather than expert
judges. Id. at 280, 292. Follow-up analyses with “expert” judges produced what Sternberg and
Lubart appear to have deemed more accurate assessments, id. at 295–96, but the post hoc character
of these assessments makes it difficult to rely on them. The study incorporated three measures of
risk preference: two tournament choices, a series of hypothetical scenarios, and a self-report
questionnaire. Id. at 292–93.
178. Id. at 296.
179. Id.
180. For more recent work of this kind, see generally Christine A. Toh & Scarlett R. Miller, The
Role of Individual Risk Attitudes on the Selection of Creative Concepts in Engineering Design, in
PROC. ASME INTERNATIONAL DESIGN ENGINEERING TECHNICAL CONF. & COMPUTERS INFO.
ENGINEERING CONF. 1 (Aug. 17–20, 2014) (concluding that risk preference was positively
correlated with creative idea selection but not with creative idea generation).
181. The dominant framework adopted from the personality psychology literature is the Big 5
model, which identifies five factors into which various aspects of personality fit: Openness to
Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. See generally
Robert R. McCrae & Paul T. Costa, Validation of the Five-Factor Model of Personality Across
Instruments and Observers, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 81 (1987) (presenting evidence
supporting the validity of the Big 5 model).
182. Feist, supra note 78, at 290.
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introverted, open to new experiences, norm-doubting, self-confident,
self-accepting, driven, ambitious, dominant, hostile, and impulsive.”183
Of these, openness to experience has “the most empirical support in
relation to creativity.”184 Openness to experience, in turn, has been linked
to risk taking.185 Other work has found that both creativity and risk taking
are correlated with the personality psychology construct sensation
seeking.186
If this hypothesis—that creative individuals have a less intense distaste
for risk than does the general population—were confirmed, it would
again carry important implications for the choice among mechanisms for
stimulating creativity in technology and the arts. But the implications
would be less straightforward than they were for the hypothesis that
creative individuals prefer risk to certainty. Here, as the conventional
wisdom suggests, creators would prefer to avoid IP risk. And IP risk
would therefore have at least some negative impact on creative output.
Still, the conventional wisdom would be overlooking a subtle, but
important point: differential tolerance of risk may increase the percentage
of creative individuals in technology and the arts. This is because IP risk
would serve as a stronger deterrent for uncreative people than for creative
ones.
Imagine, for example, that the pool of people who might potentially
pursue theatrical careers consists of one hundred creative individuals and
one hundred uncreative ones. Without IP risk, assume that all of them
183. Id. at 299. Feist’s reference to science and the arts requires some elaboration. Artists are
defined to include “students majoring in or studying art, or anyone earning an income in any of the
following domains: writing, painting, photography, cinematography, dance, music, or poetry.” Id.
at 294. Scientists are defined to include “any sample from junior high school on through adulthood
that showed special talent in science, majored in science, or that worked professionally in academic
or commercial science.” Id. Science is defined broadly to include not only “natural and biological
sciences, but [also] the social sciences (i.e., anthropology, psychology, sociology), invention,
engineering, and mathematics.” Id.
184. Id. at 303. For more recent work in this vein, see generally Scott Barry Kaufman et al.,
Openness to Experience and Intellect Differentially Predict Creative Achievement in the Arts and
Sciences, 82 J. PERSONALITY 248 (2015); Harald A. Meig et al., How Emotional Stability and
Openness to Experience Support Invention: A Study of German Independent Inventors, 243
CREATIVITY RES. J. 200 (2012).
185. See McGhee et al., supra note 151, at 560 (2012) (concluding that openness to experience
“accounted for the greatest variance when predicting risk-taking behavior” by adolescents in a
laboratory decision-making task); Nicholson et al., supra note 147, at 166 (reporting positive
correlations between openness to experience and reported frequency of risk behavior in recreation,
health, career, finance, safety, and social contexts).
186. See MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF
SENSATION SEEKING 369–72 (1994) (describing the relationship between sensation seeking and
risk taking); Nicholson et al., supra note 147, 167 (2005) (reporting data confirming hypothesis
that sensation seeking “would be associated significantly with risk taking”).
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would pursue careers in theater. The theater industry would then consist
of 50 percent creative individuals and 50 percent uncreative ones.
With IP risk, though, some of these individuals would decide to pursue
other careers. That effect will be stronger for the uncreative individuals
than the creative ones. Out of the one hundred uncreative individuals,
perhaps ninety decide to abandon their Broadway dreams and become
lawyers instead, while only ten of the one hundred creative individuals
do so. Now, creative people comprise 90 percent of the theater
industry,187 instead of the 50 percent they comprised when there was no
IP risk.
The question whether IP risk is, on net, a good or bad thing would
therefore turn on a difficult question about the relative magnitude of two
effects. First, how much do we lose from the creative people who decide
to abandon the field? Second, how much do we gain from increasing the
relative representation of creative individuals in the field?
This second effect—and the tradeoff it represents—bears a bit more
elaboration. Creativity is a social phenomenon,188 and the mixing of
professionals within a creative field might influence the quality of output
in that field.189 It therefore seems plausible that increasing the creativity
of potential collaborators in a creative field could increase the overall
creativity of work in that field. The intuition is that if all the actors Tim
Burton directs were uncreative, the quality of his films would suffer. And
so the question would be whether, as a result of IP risk, we lose more
from the Tim Burtons that abandon directorial careers than we gain from
Tim Burton having lots of Johnny Depps to work with (or, similarly, if
we lose more from the Orville Wrights that abandon engineering careers
than we gain from Orville Wright having lots of Wilbur Wrights to work
with). This is a difficult empirical question, and one that IP scholars have
yet to recognize, much less explore.

187. In this example, there are ten uncreative people left in theater, and ninety creative ones.
188. See generally Amabile, supra note 85 (highlighting the importance of social and
environmental influences on creativity and developing a framework to consider how social factors
might contribute to different stages of the creative process); Stefan Wuchty et al., The Increasing
Dominance of Teams in the Production of Knowledge, 316 SCI. 103 (2007) (exploring shifts from
an individual approach to discovery to a teamwork model in science, engineering, and arts &
humanities).
189. See generally Brian Uzzi & Jarrett Spiro, Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World
Problem, 111 AM. J. SOC’Y 447 (2005) (presenting evidence that the quality of Broadway output
is a U-shaped function of small world network characteristics).
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3. Riskier Environments Are More Conducive to Creativity than Less
Risky Ones
The third hypothesis is that environments characterized by high
degrees of risk are more conducive to creativity than those characterized
by low degrees of risk. The first two hypotheses relate to risk preferences,
so their implications for IP depend in part on the extent to which the
hypothesized risk preferences influence risk behavior.190
This
hypothesis, however, relates to how people behave in the presence of risk
without regard for how they feel about risk.
The hypothesis builds on creative place theories, which hold that the
key to understanding creative performance lies in understanding the
social environment in which creativity occurs.191 In the leading creative
place theory—Amabile’s componential theory—the social environment
influences creative performance through its effect on task motivation.192
As noted above, task motivation is the desire an individual has to engage
with a task in a particular instance, and it results from a combination of
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.193 Intrinsic motivation “arises from
the individual’s positive reaction to qualities of the task itself.”194 In this
framework, creativity is generally understood to be a positive function of
intrinsic motivation.195
There is a long-standing debate, however, about the effects of extrinsic
factors. For purposes of this Article, the most important aspect of this
debate concerns the effect of rewards on intrinsic motivation and
creativity.196 Both perspectives agree that “rewards undermine intrinsic
motivation and creativity when they lead people to feel controlled by the
situation.”197 They also agree that rewards can “enhance intrinsic
190. Cf. Sim B. Sitkin & Amy L. Pablo, Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior,
17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 9 (1992) (proposing a model in which risk behavior is a function of, inter
alia, risk preference, risk perception, and risk propensity).
191. Supra Part II.B.3.
192. See Amabile, supra note 85, at 366 (identifying task motivation as “the most important
determinant of the difference between what a person can do and what he or she will do” (emphasis
added)).
193. Id. at 365–66.
194. AMABILE, supra note 113, at 115.
195. Intrinsic motivation might facilitate creativity by focusing the individual on the problem
or task itself, rather than making the problem or task secondary to the achievement of an external
goal. Id. at 366. It also might facilitate creativity by emphasizing self-evaluation of the work rather
than external evaluation. Id. at 371–72.
196. In addition to the debate about rewards described in the text, other extrinsic motivators or
constraints that have attracted significant attention include “expected evaluation, surveillance,
competition, and restricted choice.” Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 115, at 581.
197. Amabile, supra note 85, at 370; Robert Eisenberger & Judy Cameron, Detrimental Effects
of Reward: Reality or Myth?, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 1153, 1162–63 (1996); Hennessey & Amabile,
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motivation and creativity when they confirm competence, provide useful
information in a supportive way, or enable people to do something that
they were already intrinsically motivated to do.”198
The disagreement focuses on how often rewards undermine or support
intrinsic motivation and, by extension, creativity. The dominant view is
that rewards almost always lead people to “feel controlled by the
situation”; rewards would therefore ordinarily undermine creativity.199 A
dissenting view holds that the “negative effects of reward on task interest
and creativity” occur only under conditions that “are limited and easily
remedied”; rewards would therefore typically support creativity.200
On either view, any given reward might take one of three forms. The
first is a “performance-independent reward,” which is earned “for simply
taking part in an activity,” regardless of whether the activity is completed
or successful.201 The second is a “completion-dependent reward,” which
is earned “for completing a task.”202 These two kinds of rewards are
typically understood to have negative effects on creativity because they
are perceived as controlling the individual’s behavior—the individual
views herself as participating in the activity because of the offered
reward, rather than because of her own desire to do so.203
Finally, there is a “quality-dependent reward,” which is contingent on
“performance relative to some normative information or standard.”204
This kind of reward, like the other two, can decrease intrinsic motivation
by making individuals view their own behavior as being controlled by
external factors. But only quality-dependent rewards have a potential
upside: they could “increase one’s feelings of competence because of
informational feedback concerning one’s performance relative to that of

supra note 115, at 581.
198. Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 115, at 581. See also AMABILE, supra note 113, at 119
(describing social-environmental factors, such as those supporting autonomy, competence, and task
involvement, that can influence creativity); Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 197, at 1163–64
(concluding that there is “little evidence that reward reduced intrinsic task interest”).
199. Hennessey & Amabile, supra note 115, at 581–82.
200. Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 197, at 1154. For more on this debate, see generally
Robert Eisenberger & Judith Cameron, Reward, Intrinsic Interest, and Creativity: New Findings,
53 AM. PSYCHOL. 676 (1998); Beth A. Hennessey & Teresa M. Amabile, Reality, Intrinsic
Motivation, and Creativity, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 674 (1998); Mark R. Lepper, A Whole Much Less
than the Sum of its Parts, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 675 (1998); Carol Sansone & Judith M. Harackiewicz,
“Reality” Is Complicated, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 673 (1998).
201. Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 197, at 1155.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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other individuals.”205 Quality-dependent rewards will therefore increase
creativity when the positive effects of increases in perceived competence
outweigh the negative effects of increases in perceived extrinsic control.
The debate about the general effects of rewards on creativity can
accordingly be understood as, in part, a debate about how difficult it is to
design effective quality-dependent rewards and how powerful the
potential increases in perceived competence might be.206
Even without resolving this debate, it seems clear that the effects of
rewards on creativity are likely to be highly context dependent. In any
given context, the effects will depend on whether individuals perceive the
reward primarily as (1) a controlling influence, or (2) an informative,
competence-confirming one. Empirical research on this hypothesis will
therefore have to carefully distinguish among types of IP risks and the
contexts in which creators confront them.
For an example of what it would mean for this hypothesis to be true,
return again to Claire. Suppose she is offered $1,000 to write a song—
we will stick with “Venus Fly.”207 Claire may find the process of
songwriting intrinsically appealing. But in this particular context, she
will discount her internal motivation for writing the song and overweight
her external motivation for doing so. Because she now feels controlled
by her circumstances, she will be less able to engage creative processes
that depend on feelings of autonomy and freedom from external
constraint.208 As a result, the version of “Venus Fly” she writes is rote
and uncreative.
Now suppose Claire is offered a $1,000 reward if she writes a song that
makes Pitchfork’s “Best New Music” list (or the Billboard Top Ten, or
some other appropriate metric).209 This reward, like the prior one, will
lead Claire to feel controlled by her circumstances and thereby impede
the creative process. But it will also have the beneficial effect of serving
205. Id.
206. Compare id. at 1164 (concluding that “the decremental effects of reward [on creativity]
occur under limited conditions that are easily avoided”), with Hennessey & Amabile, supra note
115, at 581–82 (arguing that research indicating ease of designing rewards that do not negatively
impact in fact shows positive effects of instructions rather than rewards, and citing research that
“also calls into question the purported ease of enhancing creativity through use of reward”).
207. This would be a “completion-dependent” reward because it is “delivered for completing a
task.” Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 197, at 1155.
208. See Ryan & Deci, supra note 120, at 68 (arguing that when an individual’s sense of
competence, autonomy, and relatedness are reduced, “diminished motivation and well-being”
results).
209. This would be a “quality-dependent” reward because it “involves the quality of one’s
performance relative to some normative information or standard.” See Eisenberger & Cameron,
supra note 197, at 1155 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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as a (potential) signal to Claire of her competence, which makes it easier
for Claire to engage in creative processes that depend on feelings of
mastery.210 The theoretical arguments are indeterminate with respect to
which effect will dominate—the negative effect of making the creator
feel controlled by extrinsic constraints, or the positive effect of making
the creator feel competent in light of extrinsic motivators. But it is at
least plausible that this kind of reward will have a net positive effect on
Claire’s creative performance. If so, then the reward would lead Claire
to write a more creative version of “Venus Fly” than she would without
it.
To date, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is ambiguous.
Aneika Simmons and Run Ren, for example, posed a series of
hypothetical problems to students and compared the creativity of
solutions offered in both high-risk and low-risk contexts.211 In the highrisk context, participants were told they would lose extra credit if their
solutions were insufficiently creative.212 In the low-risk context,
participants were told they would receive extra credit regardless of the
solutions they offered.213 The solutions offered in the high-risk context
were deemed significantly more creative than those in the low-risk
context.214 One challenge in interpreting this result is that the low-risk
context appeared to not only present less (or no) risk, it also appeared to
present less (or no) incentive. Participants in the low-risk condition had
no (extrinsic) motivation to do well, so perhaps that, rather than the
absence of risk per se, resulted in their less creative performance.
Other work indicates that risk in the environment might inhibit
creativity. For example, Amabile asked female elementary school
students to produce collages; one group was promised that the three
“best” collages would win a prize, and the other group was promised that
all participants would enter a raffle for one of three prizes.215 The first
group can be viewed as a riskier context for creative work because
creative performance itself influenced the odds of success, while in the
second group the odds of winning a prize were independent of the

210. Eisenberger & Cameron, supra note 197, at 1155.
211. Aneika L. Simmons & Run Ren, The Influence of Goal Orientation and Risk on Creativity,
21 CREATIVITY RES. J. 400, 401 (2009).
212. Id. at 405.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 406.
215. AMABILE, supra note 113, at 239; see also id. at 210–11 (reporting an experiment
indicating that work environments where employment is stable appear to be more conducive to
creativity).
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work.216 In this experiment, students in the less risky group produced
more creative drawings.217 Subsequent experiments have, however,
called these results into question, indicating that the effect may be
reversed for males (i.e., males produced more creative work in the riskier
condition), and that between-group competition—which carries with it
the risk of losing the competition—is associated with high levels of
creativity.218
While the empirical research remains unresolved, it is worth
considering in the meantime the implications of this hypothesis for the
choice of mechanisms available for stimulating creativity. Salaries
appear to do poorly, insofar as they resemble completion-dependent
rewards. Individuals typically receive salaries so long as they complete
their work—this is true at least for ordinary private sector salaries in
which employment is at-will—so they might undermine the intrinsic
motivation that is essential to creativity.
The case might be better for salaries of tenured research faculty, or
employees in other jobs that they have no fear of losing. While such
salaries might be viewed as performance-independent rewards, which
have negative effects on creativity, it is also possible that in these kinds
of cases, the connection between the salary and the creative work is
simply not salient. The negative effects on creativity that we would
otherwise expect from performance-independent rewards might therefore
be absent.
IP rights, meanwhile, also stand on unstable ground.219 To the extent
that the value of a patent or copyright reflects the value of the underlying
invention or expressive work, IP rights would plausibly be characterized
216. Id. at 239. This experimental design also may have confounded the influence of skillbased versus chance-based uncertainty. See generally Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference
and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5
(1991) (reporting results of experiments indicating differences in the ways individuals respond to
uncertainty when the outcomes depend on skill as compared to when the outcomes depend on
chance).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 240.
219. I focus in the text on IP risk of the kind associated with the financial value of the IP right.
But it is worth pausing here to note some other implications of this hypothesis for IP, although to
do so, I must relax the assumption that all kinds of IP risk have the same effects. In some
instances—such as when the United States Patent and Trademark Office determines whether a
patent application meets some threshold of nonobviousness—risk can be informative because it
communicates to the creator something about the quality of the outcome of the creative process. In
other instances—such as when a musician risks an infringement suit for including a common
melodic phrase in a song—risk can be controlling because it forces the creator to consider changing
the way she approaches the task of writing the song for reasons unrelated to the task of writing the
song itself.
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as quality-dependent rewards conveying useful information about
creators’ competence. But it seems more likely that the signal here is too
noisy—the value of an IP right will turn on many factors, only one of
which is the value of the underlying invention or expressive work (let
alone the creativity associated with the underlying invention or
expressive work).220
Furthermore, another mechanism for eliciting creativity—prizes—
might perform substantially better than either IP rights or salaries. Prizes
hold the potential to provide explicit information to creators about desired
characteristics and thereby enhance creativity. Of course, much of the
prize devil is in the details.221 Among other things, prizes for inventions
might be awarded earlier or later in the invention and commercialization
timeline; they can be awarded for making general progress in broad
technological areas or for meeting specific benchmarks to achieve
particular goals; and they might be awarded in a winner-take-all or a
shared fashion.222 Still, holding all else equal, if empirical research
indicated that the ability to convey information to creators through
quality-dependent rewards typically enhanced creativity, it should add a
thumb to the scale in favor of prizes over IP rights, and (maybe) to IP
rights over salaries.
IV. MAPPING HYPOTHESES TO REALITY
In Part III, I used a stylized world to emphasize the key conceptual
implications that flow from applying the creativity literature’s insights to
the analysis of IP risk. This Part probes the assumptions underlying that
stylized world. This Part also extends the analysis from the central
question of IP compared to alternative mechanisms for stimulating
creativity to less central, but still important, questions regarding the
particular doctrines that implement IP.

220. See Fishman, supra note 10, at 1374 (“Markets for cultural goods are susceptible to herd
behavior and information cascades in which successes and failures are driven more by social
influence than by the goods’ innate quality.”).
221. See Abramowicz, supra note 132, at 170–211 (2003) (describing implementation
difficulties for prize systems). Or consider how voting rules influence the outcome of prizes for
artistic works awarded by The Recording Academy and by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts
and Sciences. See generally Kelsey McKinney, The Grammy Voting Process Is Completely
Ridiculous, VOX (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2015/2/4/7976729/grammy-voting-process;
Todd VanDerWerff, The Oscars’ Messed-Up Voting Process, Explained, VOX (Feb. 22, 2015),
http://www.vox.com/2015/2/22/8084239/oscars-2015-ballot.
222. Abramowicz, supra note 132, at 211–35.
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A. Exploring Assumptions
1. Variations Across and Within Creative Fields
The analysis thus far has referred generally to creators, rather than
separately to artists and inventors. It is possible, however, that there are
systematic differences in the way IP risk affects artists and the way it
affects inventors. Although there appears to be a creative personality that
is common across domains of creative work, some personality differences
between artists and scientists have been identified.223 Testing of the core
hypotheses must therefore also test whether the personality differences
between artists and inventors (and between filmmakers and
photographers, or programmers and biomedical engineers) extend to their
risk preferences.
Moreover, even if it turns out that IP risk has a positive effect on
creativity for artists and inventors generally, within any given creative
field there will be individuals for whom that effect is attenuated or even
reversed. We should not be surprised that some programmers prefer to
launch their own start-ups, others prefer to work at Google or Facebook,
and still others at Microsoft or IBM. Those choices are plausibly driven
in part by differences in risk preferences. Whatever the overall effect of
IP risk on creativity, we should anticipate that it will vary for particular
individuals and in particular contexts.
Nevertheless, to the extent that creativity theories support the view that
IP risk has a positive impact on creativity, they do so in a domain-general
way. The theorized relationships between risk and creativity do not
depend on whether the creativity is being expressed in literature or
mechanical engineering. Thus, for example, Amabile draws a distinction
between domain-relevant skills—the knowledge and talents particular to
the field in which the work will occur—and creativity-relevant skills—a
set of skills that influence across domains the extent to which the creator’s
work will be creative.224 A “willingness to take risks” is a personality
trait contributing to these creativity-relevant skills; in other words,
Amabile proposes that personality traits related to a willingness to take
risks have a positive effect on creativity across domains of creative
endeavor.225 The initial hypothesis therefore ought to be that the effects
of risk on creativity are consistent across domains; although other factors
may influence the magnitude of the observed effects, the directions
223. See Feist, supra note 78, at 299–300 (“[A] consistent and clear portrait of the creative
personality in science and art has emerged . . . [but] creative people in art and science do not
completely share the same unique personality profiles.”).
224. AMABILE, supra note 113, at 85–90.
225. Id. at 90.
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should be the same.
2. Domain-Specificity of Creativity-Risk Relationship
I have so far assumed that creators’ responses to risk do not depend on
the type of risk. But individuals face many different kinds of risk,
including financial, safety, social, or ethical risks.226 Even if risk has a
positive impact on creativity, it may be that the effect is limited to risks
of a particular type. Perhaps artistic risk—the unpredictability associated
with whether an artwork will succeed on aesthetic grounds—has a
positive impact on the creativity of an artist’s work. Meanwhile, legal
risk—the unpredictability associated with whether the artist will lose an
infringement suit—might have a negative impact. And maybe financial
risk—the unpredictability associated with whether the artist will recover
her investment of time and resources in creating the work—has no
impact. It is possible, then, that creators have positive responses to some
risks, but negative responses to IP risk.
Research regarding the impact of risk on creativity does not adequately
investigate the possibility of domain specificity.227 Meanwhile, research
on the domain specificity of the general population’s risk preferences
supports both possibilities: some people exhibit risk behavior that is
consistent across domains, and other people exhibit domain-specific risk
behavior.228
Importantly, even if creators have domain-specific responses to risk,
they may still have non-uniform responses to IP risk. This is because IP
risk itself imposes risks in different domains. It imposes financial risk to
the extent that the value of the IP right cannot be known in advance.229
But IP also imposes ethical risk to the extent that people view compliance
with the law as an ethical directive, and they cannot predict whether a
given act complies with IP law’s requirements.230 It imposes social risk
to the extent that peers in a creative field may ostracize those who use IP
226. Elke U. Weber et al., A Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale: Measuring Risk Perceptions
and Risk Behaviors, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 267 (2002).
227. See, e.g., Simmons & Ren, supra note 211, at 404 (measuring creativity of problem solving
in a scenario presenting risk regarding extra class credits). Lubart and Sternberg included measures
of risks from different domains in their empirical research, but the results were inconclusive. See
generally Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90 (including measures that distinguish between taskspecific and general risks, but not distinguishing among different kinds of general risks like
financial and ethical ones).
228. Nicholson et al., supra note 147, at 159; Weber et al., supra note 226, at 263.
229. It is this kind of IP risk that was the focus of Part III.
230. Cf. Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2437, 2459 (2016) (applying the moral foundations theory to
explain the motivations of copyright plaintiffs).
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law in socially unacceptable ways by, for example, making aggressive
assertions of infringement that do not comport with accepted norms in
that field.
Moreover, there is a good reason to hesitate before concluding that
creators’ responses to risk are domain specific: creators plausibly have
domain-general responses to risk because creativity in practice requires
creators to run risks across many domains.231 Suppose, for example, that
an individual decides to create a film version of Heart of Darkness, set
during the Vietnam War rather than colonial Africa.232 Most plainly, the
individual will run some creative risks in doing so: the resulting film may
be good or bad from an artistic perspective. He will also, however, run
social risks: he may be celebrated or ridiculed for the work, whether or
not it is an artistic success. Financial risks loom large too: the film will
cost millions of dollars, but he does not know whether he will see a return
on that investment. Even health and safety risks can arise as a result of
the film: he may contract illnesses while filming in remote locations, or
injure himself performing stunts.
Subsequent research must accordingly explore two possibilities. First,
it must determine the extent to which the risk-creativity relationship is
domain general or domain specific. Second, if the risk-creativity
relationship is domain specific, empirical research must determine the
extent to which IP imposes meaningful risks in that domain.
3. Risk Intermediaries
Thus far, I have assumed that a single creator acts alone to produce a
creative work. This assumption is common, though not universal, in the
IP literature.233 By taking this assumption as true, the analysis isolated
the direct impact of IP risk on creators.
But creators typically do not act alone to produce creative work.
Instead, creators often work within, or alongside, larger organizations
devoted to financing and distributing the creative product. Musicians
sign deals with record labels, authors with book publishers, and directors

231. See Lubart & Sternberg, supra note 90, at 291 (arguing that creativity involves the
possibility of gains, like external rewards, and losses, like criticism or wasted time).
232. HEARTS OF DARKNESS: A FILMMAKER’S APOCALYPSE (American Zoetrope 1991).
233. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 27, at 38 (“We shall generally ignore differences in
costs or incentives between authors and publishers, instead using ‘author’ or ‘creator’ to mean
both.”); Jonathan Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389, 394 (2014)
(describing the typical model of “the author-based incentive case for [and against] copyright” as a
“stylized environment” in which there is a “single act of authorial creation, which then generates a
creative work immediately ready for consumption by the end-user”).
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with film studios.234 Most engineers and other inventors work as
employees of corporate entities that finance their inventive activities.235
Although there are exceptions, these arrangements are pervasive.
There are three basic economic reasons proposed for the pervasiveness
of these arrangements.236 First, the creative work itself might be
expensive—think of big-budget Hollywood blockbusters or
pharmaceutical drug development—and firms may have cheaper access
to the capital required to finance it.237 Second, even if the creative work
itself is cheap to produce, there are capital-intensive tasks associated with
bringing creative work to the market, again leading creators to rely on
intermediaries for less expensive capital.238 Third, these arrangements
allow creators to shift project-specific risk (which is typically high in the
context of creative work) to entities positioned to spread it across multiple
projects.239
The ubiquity of these arrangements challenges the plausibility of the
first hypothesis articulated in Part III.240 After all, if creators prefer risk
to certainty and firms are either risk neutral or risk averse, then all else
equal, we should observe arrangements that transfer risk from firms to
creators, rather than the other way around. So if the first hypothesis is
true, other factors must account for the tendency of creators to shift risk

234. Barnett, supra note 233, at 405.
235. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999) (defending default rules and contractual enforcement presumptions
by which firms ordinarily obtain ownership of inventions their employees invent).
236. These functions are so crucial and widespread that some have argued that IP law ought to
be understood as providing incentives for intermediaries to perform these tasks, rather than
providing incentives for creators to create the works in the first instance. Barnett, supra note 233,
at 404–14 (arguing that the primary effect of copyright law should be understood to be the provision
of incentives to intermediaries); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267–71 (1977) (proposing that patent rights be awarded as prospects that
provide their holders incentives to engage in the commercialization and development of
inventions); but see Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS.
L. REV. 613, 668–71 (2014) (questioning the arguments for altering copyright “to give
intermediaries strengths not given to other industries”); Lemley, supra note 26, at 129–31
(evaluating the effects of incentivizing creators).
237. Barnett, supra note 233, at 394–98, 401–02.
238. Id. at 401–02. Intermediaries will have access to internal capital from their portfolios of
earlier creative works, and that internal sources of capital will be cheaper than external sources that
suffer from valuation problems associated with the unpredictability of creative work. Id.
239. Id. at 398–402; Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing
Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 54 (2013).
240. They might also be thought to challenge the relevance of these hypotheses. But as
explained previously, the effect of IP risk directly on creators matters because the arrangements
between creators and intermediaries are not exogenous to the system’s legal regimes, nor are they
necessarily invariant over time. See supra text accompanying notes 145–163.
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to intermediaries.
On the other hand, the arrangements are consistent with the second
hypothesis. Even though there may be socially preferred sorting
implications from IP risk, the second hypothesis proposes that creators,
like most people, prefer certainty to risk. This could explain their
observed tendency to shift risk to intermediaries. The arrangements are
also consistent with the third hypothesis, which proposes that creators
may not prefer risk but nonetheless produce more creative work in its
presence.241 If so, then the risk-pooling function of intermediaries is
privately preferred but socially costly. Creators and intermediaries can
enter into mutually beneficial arrangements that shift risk from the creator
to the intermediary, even though such arrangements result in less
creativity. As a result, intermediaries may interfere with the positive
effect of risk on creativity.
We might more generally think that creators and intermediaries
already optimize the influence of these arrangements on creativity.
Assuming intermediaries are rational, perfectly informed, and profitmaximizing, it would seem that, to the extent that optimizing creativity
would maximize profits, intermediaries would design contracts with
creators that optimize creativity. But creative work is likely to generate
positive externalities—inventions and expressive works are both
associated with large spillovers.242 If so, then intermediary-creator
arrangements would not optimize creativity because intermediaries
would be unable to appropriate anything close to the full social value
associated with creativity.243 Thus, even if creators would prefer to be
exposed to more risk, intermediaries would refuse to allow them such
exposure. Put slightly differently, creators who have the greatest
preference for risk (and correspondingly greatest potential for creative
work) might be undesirable partners for intermediaries precisely because
their comparative advantage is in work the value of which the
241. Supra Part III.
242. See Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L.
& ECON. 649, 659–61 (2007) (describing ubiquity of spillovers from expressive works); Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258–61 (2007) (describing
ubiquity of spillovers from innovation). While this point is not restricted to the influence of risk
on creativity (it applies more generally to intermediaries’ incentives to invest in creative work), it
would plausibly impact the nature of intermediary-creator relationships in ways that are central to
this Article’s analysis.
243. I do not here express an opinion on the question regarding the magnitude of positive
externalities associated with creative work; for an introduction to the issue, see Frischmann &
Lemley, supra note 242, at 264–68 (describing the conventional wisdom regarding the detrimental
effects of innovation spillovers on incentives to invest in innovation); id. at 268–84 (arguing that
the presence of spillovers promotes innovation); see also Frischmann, supra note 242 (making
similar arguments in the context of copyright law).
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intermediary will be less capable of internalizing.
Finally, as explored in greater detail below, creators’ decisions likely
deviate from rational choice models. Framing effects, loss aversion, and
other influences on behavior limit the viability of a revealed preference
approach to understanding how IP risk influences creators.
In sum, we should hesitate before reading too much into existing
private arrangements between creators and intermediaries. Testing of the
hypotheses developed in this Article will inform the question of how we
ought to respond to the prevalence of intermediaries in creative
production.
4. Quantitative Risk and Uncertainty
The analysis so far has used risk as an umbrella concept encompassing
both quantitative risk and uncertainty. Doing so helped emphasize
implications that flow from the role that indeterminate outcomes—
whether in the form of quantitative risk or uncertainty—play in creativity.
But empirical investigations of the effects of risk on creativity will have
to attend to differences between quantitative risk and uncertainty because
the tools used to model choice under quantitative risk only apply to choice
under uncertainty if certain conditions—unlikely to be met here—are
satisfied.244
The standard approach to modeling choice under quantitative risk is
the expected utility framework.245 In that framework, an individual
evaluating a quantitatively risky option determines the utility she would
receive from that option by adding the utility she would receive from each
possible outcome, discounted by the probability distribution describing
the likelihood of it occurring.246 The individual then chooses among
risky options by picking whichever one maximizes expected utility. So
long as the probability distributions associated with outcomes conform to
some basic axioms, the expected utility framework can be used to predict
choices among risky options. And those axioms are readily satisfied in
cases presenting quantitative risk.
But the scenarios creators face are unlikely to present quantitative risk.
244. This empirical work will also have to attend to the mathematical operationalization of risk.
Although it is common to operationalize risk as variance, that is just one way to describe a
distribution of possible outcomes, and it may be that the models should account for other
descriptions of the distribution, like skewness or kurtosis. See generally James Ming Chen,
Momentary Lapses of Reason: The Psychophysics of Law and Behavior, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV.
607 (proposing a four-moment capital-asset-pricing model to account for affective inputs to
decision making under risk).
245. Machina, supra note 36, at 130.
246. Elke U. Weber, Risk Attitude and Preference, 1 COGNITIVE SCI. 79, 79 (2010).
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In the real world, quantitative risk can rarely be found outside a casino.247
Creators, however, are not playing roulette. Instead, they confront
uncertainty because the likelihoods associated with the possible
outcomes they face are not “exogenously specified or scientifically
calculable.”248
That creators face uncertainty does not necessarily require that we
abandon the expected-utility framework.
Creators might assign
subjective probabilities to possible outcomes. People do a version of this
when they say, for example, that the Golden State Warriors have a 90
percent chance of winning the title this year. So long as individuals
estimate subjective probabilities for uncertain outcomes, and those
probabilities conform to certain axioms, the expected utility framework
can be applied to choice under uncertainty just as it is applied to choice
under quantitative risk.249
As Daniel Ellsberg famously argued, however, those axioms are
unlikely to be satisfied. People making choices under uncertainty appear
to violate both the complete ordering requirement and the Sure Thing
Principle—two of the axioms that subjective probabilities must satisfy
for the expected utility framework to apply.250 As a result, standard
expected utility approaches will not be well suited to modeling the
decisions of creators under IP risk, and one of a number of alternative
approaches should be adopted instead.251 Choosing among those
247. Players know before the wheel spins that there is a 46.37 percent chance that a bet on black
will pay off. At least, if you are playing on an American roulette table (i.e., with double zeros). J.
Andrew Archer, The Odds Meet the Great Martingale, 69 MATHEMATICS TCHR. 234, 235 (1976).
248. Machina & Rothschild, supra note 43, at 190; see also Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity,
and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 661, 666 (1961) (identifying “the results of Research
and Development” and “the outcome of a proposed innovation” as situations posing uncertainty
rather than quantitative risk) (emphasis omitted)); Heath & Tversky, supra note 216, at 6
(explaining that Ellsberg’s research presents “a serious problem for expected utility theory . . .
because, with the notable exception of games of chance, most decisions in the real world depend
on uncertain events whose probabilities cannot be precisely assessed”).
249. For the formal argument, see generally Leonard J. Savage, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
STATISTICS (1954). For a summary, see generally Machina, supra note 36.
250. See Ellsberg, supra note 248, at 647–56. The complete ordering requirement demands that
a person (1) prefer uncertain option A to uncertain option B; (2) prefer B to A; or (3) be indifferent
between the two. Id. at 648. The Sure Thing Principle demands that a person who prefers A to B
also prefers A + C to B + C. Ellsberg showed that individuals’ decisions tend to violate these
axioms when asked to compare choices involving drawing colored balls from urns with known and
unknown distributions. Id.; David Schmeidler, Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without
Additivity, 57 ECONOMETRICA 571, 572, 585 (1989).
251. See, e.g., Binmore et al., supra note 46, at 233 (concluding that the principle of insufficient
reason better predicted choices in an experiment involving choices between quantitatively risky
and uncertain options than did alternative models); Farber, supra note 43, at 927–35 (comparing
tools to model uncertainty).
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approaches requires answering normative and empirical questions that
are beyond the scope of this Article, but that will ultimately have to be
resolved.
5. Framing, Affect, and Other Contextual Factors
I have so far set aside context-specific variables so as to derive some
hypotheses concerning the general risk-creativity relationship. But since
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s introduction of prospect theory,
a wealth of empirical evidence has shown that many context-specific
variables influence decision making under risk.252 Here, I identify four
variables that are likely to play an important role in empirical tests of the
risk-creativity relationship.
First, individuals respond differently to prospective gains than they do
to prospective losses.253 People are loss averse—they dislike prospective
losses more intensely than they enjoy prospective gains of equivalent
value.254 And while they are usually risk averse with respect to potential
gains, they are also ordinarily risk seeking with respect to potential
losses.255 This means that creators’ responses to IP risk will depend on
the framing of any given risky option from a reference point that
determines whether it is viewed as presenting possible gains or possible
losses.
One plausible framing is that IP rights represent potential gains for an
initial creator (and soon-to-be rights-holder) who hopes to earn royalties
or supracompetitive profits. Another is that IP rights represent potential
losses from the perspective of a user (or subsequent creator) who worries
about possible infringement liability.256 If these framings accurately
reflect how creators and users view their decisions, then IP rights may
lead to relatively risk-averse behavior by creators and relatively riskseeking behavior by users (including subsequent creators who
consciously draw on the protected works of others).
Importantly, however, this framing is not inevitable.257 Thus, a user
252. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 49, at 264 (proposing prospect theory as a model of
choice under risk to account for observed deviations from classic expected utility theory, including
overweighting certain outcomes and differential treatment of prospective gains as compared to
prospective losses).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. That is, they prefer an option that carries an expected loss of x to the certainty of losing
something less than x.
256. See Horowitz, supra note 63, at 331 (arguing that people who want to use copyrights
owned by others will view the copyright as posing potential losses).
257. Cf. id. at 354 n.116 (recognizing that framing is malleable, but nonetheless adopting the
standard framing of “copyright holders seeking gains” and “users as facing losses,” and expressing
intuition that it is likely correct).
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may view the IP right of another as imposing potential losses to the extent
that she takes the applicable reference point to be a scenario in which she
has used the material covered by the IP right and all that is left is to
determine whether she infringed and must pay damages. Alternatively,
she may include the IP right of another as part of her estimate of potential
gains if she frames her decision as whether to use the material in the first
instance. In this alternative framing, her estimate of the utility she
anticipates from the use would include both the benefits she expects to
receive—making her own creation more valuable or intrinsically
satisfying—and the costs she expects to incur—having to pay damages if
she is held liable for infringement. The point is not to say that one or
another of these frames is necessarily correct; instead, it is to highlight
that framing is contingent, and the chosen framing may influence whether
IP rights are viewed as imposing potential gains or potential losses, even
in logically equivalent scenarios.
Second, optimism bias and overconfidence may also influence the riskcreativity relationship. Optimism bias refers to a decision maker’s
overestimation of the probabilities associated with positive outcomes,
and underestimation of the probabilities associated with negative
outcomes.258 If creators think that positive results are more likely to
occur than they actually are, their behavior may be driven more by a
mistaken evaluation of the risks involved, rather than by an actual
preference for risk. Overconfidence, meanwhile, refers to a decision
maker’s exaggerated view of her own abilities.259 If a creator correctly
perceives that the odds of success are low, but wrongly thinks that her
own abilities will enable her to overcome those odds, then apparently
risk-seeking behavior will be driven not by her preference for risk, but by
her misevaluation of her own ability. And these are not mutually
exclusive possibilities. To the contrary, it is most likely the case that
these effects interact with each other. As a result, empirical work will
have to carefully distinguish the contributions that each of these
phenomena—risk preferences, optimism bias, and overconfidence—
make to observed risk behavior.
Third, individuals making decisions under uncertainty may prefer
258. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 340; Alain Samson, Selected Behavioral Science
Concepts, in THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GUIDE 28, 37 (Alain Samson ed., 2015).
259. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1091–95 (2000); see
also Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The Trouble with Overconfidence, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 502,
502–03 (2008) (distinguishing among three types of overconfidence: (1) overestimation of one’s
own abilities or chances of success; (2) mistaken belief in one’s placement on a distribution relative
to peers; and (3) excessive confidence in “the accuracy of one’s beliefs”).
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choices where the uncertainty is connected to skill rather than to
randomness.260 Thus, IP risk that manifests itself as related to the ability
of the creator—like the risk associated with the value of the IP right—
may have a positive relationship to creativity, while IP risk that manifests
itself as essentially random—like the risk associated with a jury’s
determination of whether a musical work is substantially similar to
another—may have a negative relationship to creativity.
Finally, affect may influence decision-making.261 Although standard
approaches include anticipated emotions in the utility function, they
typically omit the role of anticipatory emotions in the decision-making
process.262 That is, standard approaches recognize that the emotions an
individual expects to feel if an outcome occurs (or does not occur) will
influence her estimate of the utility she will derive from that outcome.
But they typically ignore the role played by emotions that an individual
feels while making a decision, and those emotions may influence
decisions independent of cognitively-relevant factors like the probability
of an outcome and its expected utility.263 For example, the anxiety
induced by contemplating uncertainty may partly explain risk-averse
decision making.264 As a result, tests of these hypotheses may need to
account for the role that affect plays in different kinds of IP-relevant
decisions—maybe creators are happy while they are in the midst of
creating, but anxious when making career decisions that force them to
consider the risk profiles of possible incomes—and these different
emotional valences result in distinct effects of IP risk on creativity.
B. Applications to IP Doctrine
There are potentially widespread implications for IP if subsequent tests
support the hypotheses articulated in this Article. Although it would be
premature to provide a complete assessment of these implications without
empirical results to guide the analysis, the brief sketch below serves to
260. See generally Heath & Tversky, supra note 216 (presenting results of experiments
indicating that people prefer betting on events where their skill or knowledge allows them to take
credit for success and insulate against blame for failure, as opposed to events where lack of skill or
ignorance mean that success will be attributed to luck and failure to incompetence).
261. See generally Loewenstein et al., supra note 47 (arguing that decision making under risk
is influenced by “anticipatory emotions”—that is, emotions like dread or anxiety that are felt when
confronting risk).
262. Id. at 267–68.
263. Id. at 271.
264. Id. at 272–74. For another illustration, consider that feeling hungry while shopping
induces people to spend more at a supermarket, even though they will not consume the food until
much later. See RICHARD THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 6–
7 (2015).
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motivate research in this area by highlighting its potential importance for
how we understand the effects of IP doctrines.
1. Implications for Patent Law: The Example of Definiteness
For an example of how risky IP doctrines might affect creativity,
consider patent law’s rules regarding the clarity required of a claim.265 A
patent ends with a set of claims purporting to define the boundaries of a
patentee’s right to exclude.266 But those claims are notoriously difficult
to interpret, resulting in significant risk regarding the scope of a
patentee’s rights.267
The Supreme Court has recently weighed in on one of the core
doctrines dealing with claim clarity: the definiteness requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112. The statute requires that a patent “conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the [applicant] . . . regards as the invention.”268 The Federal
Circuit had long held that statutory language to demand only that the
claims not be “insolubly ambiguous”; so long as it was possible to come
up with some interpretation of the claims, the definiteness requirement
was met, even if it was difficult to determine which among multiple
plausible interpretations to adopt.269 In Nautilus v. Biosig, the Supreme
Court replaced that permissive standard with the more stringent
requirement that claims “inform those skilled in the art about the scope
of the invention with reasonable certainty.”270 The Court did so in part
because it worried that the Federal Circuit’s standard resulted in vague
patent claims, creating “a zone of uncertainty” that deterred innovative
activity.271 On the standard view regarding IP risk, Nautilus’ more
265. For the most recent Supreme Court articulation of the definiteness standard, see Nautilus,
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (concluding that a patent claim is
indefinite when it “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
scope of the invention”).
266. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (providing that a patent “specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a
joint inventor regards as the invention”).
267. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 8–10 (criticizing patent law for failing to provide
adequate notice of patent scope); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009) (criticizing modern
peripheral claiming approach as “inherently indeterminate”); Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture
of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2014) (describing contributions of
indefiniteness and claim construction doctrines to uncertainty regarding patent rights).
268. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
269. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
270. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129; Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chem. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 630–
31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (recognizing that Nautilus adopted a stricter indefiniteness standard).
271. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
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stringent definiteness requirement should have a salutary effect on
inventors’ incentives.272
But the analysis presented here suggests that we need to consider other
possibilities. If the first hypothesis—that creators prefer risk to
certainty—is confirmed, then Nautilus could undermine inventive
activity by: (1) reducing the amount of creativity inventors incorporate
into a given work; (2) reducing the number of creative works inventors
produce; or (3) making inventive careers less attractive to inventors. If
the second hypothesis—that creators tolerate risk more than the general
population—is confirmed, then Nautilus could have ambiguous effects
on inventive activity. Inventors may well be encouraged by the increased
certainty with which they can determine the scope of patent claims
(which allows them to better predict whether a proposed invention
infringes on the patent of another). This beneficial effect would have to
be compared to the negative effect of encouraging less creative
individuals to enter inventive fields by reducing the uncertainty that
previously deterred them to a greater extent than it deterred more creative
individuals. And if the third hypothesis—that risk increases creativity
even if creators themselves dislike it— is confirmed, then we might worry
that inventors’ positive reaction to Nautilus carries with it
underappreciated social costs.
Moreover, as the exploration of the assumptions above indicated, the
actual impact of a case like Nautilus will be difficult to sort out. Some
inventors will see Nautilus as affecting their prospective gains from
patents and others as affecting prospective losses; independent inventors
may respond to it differently than those working within intermediaries;
and inventors with stronger affective inputs to decision making may
respond differently than those with weaker ones. Nor is definiteness the
only patent doctrine where these kinds of influences will arise. Instead,
we should expect that similar things might be said about the claim
construction process more generally,273 the rules for determining
damages associated with infringement,274 and the application of
disclosure doctrines like the written description requirement.275 The
272. See Reilly, supra note 267, at 1353–54 (summarizing commentary describing benefits of
increased certainty from Nautilus’s stricter indefiniteness standard).
273. See generally Reilly, supra note 267 (describing general uncertainty associated with claim
construction post-Nautilus).
274. See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115,
117–19 (2015) (describing the challenges courts face in calculating damages for patent
infringement).
275. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (holding that Section 112 includes a written description requirement distinct from the
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lesson for now is simply that even apparently salutary developments like
Nautilus will have complex effects on innovative activity.
2. Implications for Copyright Law: The Example of Fair Use
Courts and commentators have long struggled to make sense of
copyright’s fair use doctrine.276 The common thread in these efforts has
been a sense that the doctrine’s unpredictability prevents it from
achieving its aim of protecting (some) otherwise infringing uses—
because it is too difficult to determine whether a given use is fair, creators
who would otherwise rely on fair use avoid creating at all.277 The
analysis in this Article suggests that the situation must be treated with
significantly more nuance than it has been so far.
Empirical research may show that the risk associated with the fair use
doctrine appeals to creative individuals.278 Or maybe it drives out many
more uncreative individuals than creative ones, with the result that the
mix of people producing expressive works is more creative than it would
be if we had an easy-to-predict fair use doctrine. Or perhaps the
uncertainty associated with fair use is part of a risky environment that is
conducive to creativity, even though the creators themselves dislike it.
This example also highlights that the ultimate prescriptive implications
of such research will depend on resolving difficult normative questions.
I have throughout taken as a premise that one goal of patent and copyright
law is to promote creativity in technology and the arts. While this is a
fairly uncontroversial (though not inevitable) premise, it is also surely the
case that other goals may have more normative appeal in particular
circumstances. And the fair use doctrine highlights one area where the
normative foundations of the law may diverge from the promotion of
creativity.279
enablement requirement, applicable to both amended and original claims, and requiring that “the
disclosure of the application . . . reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date”); see also Allen K. Yu, The En Banc
Federal Circuit’s Written Description Requirement: Time for the Supreme Court to Reverse
Again?, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 895, 911–13 (2012) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s written
description law for being unpredictable).
276. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 889 (arguing that “160 years of case law” on fair use have
been “particularly unhelpful,” rendering fair use “too ambiguous to provide much ex ante guidance”
to a prospective defendant).
277. See supra notes 37–42 (citing sources).
278. Cf. 2 LIVE CREW, AS CLEAN AS THEY WANNA BE (Lil’ Joe Records, Inc. 1989); DANGER
MOUSE, THE GREY ALBUM (Danger Mouse 2004); GIRL TALK, NIGHT RIPPER (Illegal Art 2006).
279. But note that promoting creativity is at least part of the Supreme Court’s understanding of
why we have a fair use doctrine. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (noting that fair
use “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
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Specifically, the fair use doctrine may try to further expression without
regard to its creativity: central to this doctrine is the promotion of
expressions like criticism, political debate, and news commentary that, if
not entirely lacking in creativity, surely fall on a different part of the
creative spectrum than do things like novels, songs, and abstract art.280
To the extent that the beneficial effects of fair use risk are limited to the
more creative kinds of works, then increasing (or maintaining) fair use
risk would have a detrimental impact on core copyrightable expressions
like criticism, political debate, and news commentary. In short, even if
IP risk has the beneficial effects hypothesized here, it will likely continue
to have downsides with respect to other aims, perhaps forcing difficult
tradeoffs among conflicting normative goals. Resolving those conflicts
is, however, a project for another day.
CONCLUSION
IP scholars have been too quick to conclude that creators are risk
averse and that, as a result, IP risk is harmful. But it would also be too
soon to conclude that IP risk is a good thing. In this Article, I have
articulated the most plausible hypotheses regarding how IP risk affects
creativity. Subsequent testing of these hypotheses will improve efforts to
use the law to stimulate creativity. IP scholars must push further into this
uncertain territory than we have so far. If we do not, we run the risk of
continuing to implement IP policies that inhibit the creative minds
responsible for everything from the airplane to, well, Airplane!

stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
280. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1630–35 (1982) (explaining
that externalities associated with, for example, teaching, scholarship, historical analysis, and
political speech will frustrate efficient market transactions over copyrighted expression, justifying
reliance on fair use instead).

